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ABSTRACT 
This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's 
post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account 
the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by 
addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work 
overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats 
true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the 
mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and 
foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about 
Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. 
The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the 
subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. 
In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate 
subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's 
conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and 
Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully 
address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective 
conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the 
relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of 
universal, foundational epistemology. 
These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political 
philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts 
of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in 
political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically 
and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to 
justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the 
work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will defend an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's 
post -structuralist philosophy and use this to argue that political philosophy needs to take 
into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and knowledge. I 
argue this against political theory that abstracts from historical and political contingency 
by citing universal interests and disinterested claims to the truth. Throughout the 
argument, I will explain Foucault's conceptions of power and knowledge with reference 
to the historical philosophical contexts of humanism, existential phenomenology, 
structuralism, Marxism and Nietzschean genealogy, out of which Foucault's post-
structuralism developed. The dialectical interpretation of Foucault I take involves a 
rejection of metaphysics of presence, Cartesian dualism, Kant's distinction between 
noumena and phenomena, and the distinction between facts and values. Due to ongoing 
temporal flux, identity is never discrete. Mind and body, intuition and conceptualisation, 
knowledge and purpose are co-constitutive. Through Foucault, I argue that both 
subjectivity and knowledge are constituted historically, in relations of power. Who we are 
and what we know is constructed in relation to our desires; our desires, in turn, are 
historically constructed through our ongoing interactions with the world, others and 
knowledge. 
My argument is divided into three chapters, the first two dealing with ontology, and the 
last with epistemology. In the first chapter I use Foucault's work to argue, in terms of 
dialectical intentionality, that the identity of the subject is constituted in relation to her 
ongoing interactions with the world. I explain Foucault's conception of subjectivity by 
contrasting it against Sartre' s understanding of transcendent freedom to show how, in 
light of the problems I draw about his earlier work from the exchange between he and 
Sartre, Foucault came to abandon the a-historical discourse-constructivism of his 
Archaeological work. In the second chapter I will show how this move leads Foucault to 
theorise freedom in terms of reciprocally generated relations of power. I explain 
Foucault's analysis of relations between individuals in terms of dialectical negation. With 
Foucault, I argue that one' s ongoing, changing relations with others involve conflicts of 
interest, which are constitutive of one' s identity, yet this need not rule out freedom. In 
fact, such freedom assures us of the historical and political contingency of sUbjectivity. 
This is a problem for political philosophy that abstracts from such contingency with a 
pretension to a-historical universality. Lastly, I use the methodology and ontology 
developed in the first two chapters, to defend Foucault's conception ofpower/knowledge. 
I argue that knowledge is historically generated in relations of power. This entails that 
knowledge is never impartial. Foucault recognises the necessity of continually re-
evaluating our beliefs as things change. Accepting the historical and political contingency 
of knowledge, his work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political 
philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DIALECTICAL INTENTIONALITY 
In this chapter, I draw from a debate between Foucault and Sartre the explanation that it 
was as a result of problems with its a-historicism that Foucault came to abandon the 
discourse-constructivism of his earlier work. To demonstrate the need for historicism in 
political philosophy, I trace the development of the philosophical problem of the 
constitution of subjectivity that brought Foucault and Sartre to focus on this issue. In 
doing so I motivate an historicist ontology of subjectivity, which I will draw on in the 
following chapters. The chapter is divided into three parts, the first comprising Foucault's 
Archaeological critique of Sartre's existential phenomenology. Here I develop an account 
of the theoretical divide between structuralism and existential phenomenology, picking 
out particular objections Foucault levelled against Sartre's work, both directly and by 
implication. This serves the purpose of identifying important problems facing Foucault 
following The Archaeology of Knowledge, concerning his structuralist methodology, 
which will help explain the trajectory of his later works, most especially in the 
development of a theory of power relations which I explore in the following chapter. 
The rest of the chapter explores the ontological groundwork done on the question of 
SUbjectivity by Sartre. This is done by way of an assessment of Sartre's model of 
consciousness in relation to the objection levelled against it by Foucault. I will first 
identify the philosophical problems inherited by existential phenomenology, tracing 
development of Sartre's ontology through its philosophical history. This will show that 
Foucault's objections to Sartre were of the very sort Sartre had levelled against Husserl 
before him, problems going back to the dualist distinction of body and mind in Descartes. 
I will show that Sartre's ontology of consciousness does not amount to the a-historical 
model of transcendent consciousness to which Foucault objected. Rather, consciousness 
is a product of the ongoing historical relations between the subject and her world. This 
contrast between Sartre and the early Foucault will lay the groundwork for an evaluation 
of Foucault's later conceptions of freedom and subjectivity in line with Sartre that will be 
concluded in chapter two. 
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PART I: FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE 
Although he persistently demonstrates the thread of continuity in the development of his 
work, Foucault has no qualms about the fact that there have been changes in the direction 
of his focus, involving a move from a study of the determinations of discourse, to his 
analysis of techniques of subjectification in Western society. In this section I will be 
dealing principally with the Foucault of the Archaeology of Knowledge, as it was at this 
stage that his theory most contrasted with Sartre' s, and it is the exchange between Sartre 
and Foucault that I draw on to demonstrate the need for historicism in political 
philosophy, which Foucault himself came to realise. In the radical intellectual and 
political environment following the 1968 Paris riots, Foucault's structuralist proclamation 
of the death of man had a major impact in French philosophy, lending impetus to those 
who rejected the hegemony of bourgeois, individualistic, subject-centred discourses such 
as existential phenomenology. What was the substance of this critique? 
I begin with an examination of the main points of disagreement between the opposing 
fields of structuralism and phenomenology. In doing so, I indicate the theoretical divide 
that informed the particular issues separating Foucault and Sartre over questions of 
freedom and subjectivity. I will then go on to discuss these issues by way of Foucault's 
structuralist, archaeological assault on the phenomenological account of consciousness, 
followed by Sartre's response to these criticisms I Foucault's response to the sort of 
criticisms made by Sartre led to his abandonment of archaeological discourse-centred 
analysis and a consideration of the historical constitution of discourse. The dialogue with 
Sartre that I will be considering reveals the indebtedness of Foucault' s generation of 
thinkers to the development of existential phenomenology, despite (or perhaps by way of) 
their vehement criticism thereof. 
I I will evaluate these objections to Sartre's ontology of consciousness in detail in the final section of this 
chapter. 
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Section One: The opposing disciplines of structuralism and phenomenology 
Questions regarding the constitution of subjectivity form the bone of contention between 
structuralism and phenomenology. This problem arises from Descartes' dualist 
distinction between body and mind, which posits the priority of the mind as the 
foundation of knowledge and certainty. This distinction continued in modem philosophy 
with Kant, who distinguished noumena and phenomena, positing the a priori categories 
of the mind as the conditions of knowledge. Such philosophy is a-historicist, as it 
abstracts the knowing subject from the external contingencies that affect her, thus 
pretending to derive universal principles of knowledge from the necessary features of 
human consciousness. With Descartes, knowledge comes to be seen in philosophy as 
grounded in the constituting activity of the knowing subject. The important question, 
then, over which structuralists and phenomenologists disagree, is how this subject itself is 
constituted. This becomes important for political theory, as this thesis will show. 
Following on from Descartes and Kant, existential phenomenology carne to focus on the 
meaning-giving determination of the subject of thought. Following from Husserl and 
Heidegger, Sartre developed an ontology of transcendental consciousness, looking at 
'man's involvement in the world as the condition of the world's possibility,2. Critical of 
the metaphysical grounds of Cartesian reason, abstracted from actual experience, 
existential phenomenologists tried to make explicit all that is taken for granted in 
expenence. 
Sartre's ontology of the subject serves as a vehicle for analysing the conditions of human 
history. He identifies the radical freedom of consciousness as the condition of our 
experience and activity, the subject as the source of intelligibility for any theoretical 
investigation3. The emphasis of existential phenomenology was to show how the 
structure of the consciousness of the subject is integral to any analysis of our collective 
existence. The world we perceive carries with it the traces of our consciousness, as it 
2 Poster, M. 1984: 26 
3 Ibid 
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does in Kant's phenomenal realm. Structuralists rejected this approach for neglecting the 
structural conditions of individual consciousness. They criticised existential 
phenomenology for failing to make a clear break from the dualistic Cartesian subject, by 
clinging to the notion of a constituting subjectivity, that is, a subject through whom 
meaning is constituted. Said explains this critically by saying that, prior to the 
structuralist assault on consciousness, history had been seen to acquire its intelligibility 
through an 'anthropomorphism projected onto events.'4 
The work of Ferdinand de Saussure had a powerful influence on the work of many 
theorists after the Second World War, leading to a multi-disciplinary investigation of the 
structures through which meaning is produced in society. The consequent development of 
structuralism gave way to a departure from the analysis of consciousness, which had 
preoccupied philosophers and social scientists since Kant: the study of the conditions of 
perception, reason, knowledge and thought5. Instead, these conditions were investigated, 
first through language, and later through cultural practices. Structuralists rejected 
existential phenomenology's notion of radical human freedom and focused instead on the 
way that human behaviour is determined by cultural, social and psychological structures. 
Barthes and Derrida showed how structuralism could be applied to literature, Lacan to 
psychology, Althusser to Marxism and social analysis, and Foucault to the history of 
scientific discourse. 
With the onset of structuralism, language, the unconscious and social practices began to 
be analysed in structural terms. This shift brought forth a critique of subjectivity. It 
showed up the illusion of 'self-presence' perpetuated by a subject-centred discourse6. The 
total sense of discourse came to be seen as depending on circumstances that have nothing 
to do with the speaker's identity. Said identifies this move away from existential 
phenomenology in the distinction between the 'I think' and the '[ speak'. Having initiated 
4 Said, E. "Foucault as an Intellectual Imagination" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 41 . 
5 Dreyfuss & Rabinow. 1982: 35. 
6 This makes use of Derrida's critique of metaphysics of presence, which neglects to account for the 
becoming of being, wherein the meaning of a concept, or term, is acquired through its relationship with 
what it is not. (Derrida, J. 1997: 13).1 will show in the flrst two chapters that this critique of self-presence 
has in fact had a place in phenomenology since its development by Hegel. 
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the break away from Descartes' constituting cogito7 and the consequent interiority of 
knowledge, existentialism gave way to the exteriority of discourse - "language as being 
for itself without subjectivity encompassing it"S. Structuralism thus challenged 
existentialism's Cartesian premise of a unified truth of interiority. No longer was 
knowledge confined to any particular form of subjectivity, such as that ontologised by 
Sartre, for example. Knowledge came to be seen by many structuralists as independent of 
the intervention of human subjectivity. Foucault noted at the time, "this philosophy which 
since Descartes has given primacy to the subject, is falling apart before our eyes ... ,,9 
Thus, while Sartre's strategy had been to oppose the notion of an isolated rational subject, 
instead positing consciousness as an intentional relation, he nevertheless continued to see 
consciousness as playing a role in the formation of knowledge, as I will demonstrate. 
Structuralists rejected placing the subject as the origin of meaning. The analysis of 
structure was seen to be a way of bypassing the constituting role of consciousness 
Descartes had given it, which existential phenomenology was seen to maintain. In the 
confrontation between structuralism and existential phenomenology, negotiation gave 
way to revolution, giving rise to the appearance of discontinuity. 
Section Two: Foucault's Archaeological assault on Phenomenology 
For existentialists, the practical considerations of Dasein or being-for-itself determine the 
theoretical strategies we adopt. Foucault's archaeology, on the other hand, aimed to move 
beyond the philosophical task of investigating the a-historical conditions of 
consciousness. He rejected the phenomenological attempt to ground the conditions of the 
possibility of knowledge in the constituting activity of the transcendental subject (albeit a 
body-subject necessarily involved in the world), opting instead for a model of discourse 
whereby an emphasis is placed on the constituting role of language. It was for this reason 
that he developed the archaeological method - as a means of grounding his analysis of 
social practices and the history of knowledge in the autonomous regularities and 
7 The ' I think ' for Descartes, is the basis for certainty, as opposed to experience of the actual world. 
8 Ibid: 56. ' 
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determinations of discourse. Over the question of reason in history, Sartre and Foucault 
initially took opposing directions in their search for an anchor in analysis. While Sartre 
developed an ontology of constituting consciousness, Foucault developed an account of 
the autonomous rules of discourse. 
With archaeology, Foucault claims, there is no need to pass through the subject in order 
to analyse the history of knowledge. Foucault challenged the primacy of the subject. 
Discourse is autonomous from any particular constituent subjectivitylO In opposition to 
Sartre "who made human consciousness the originary subject of all progress and of every 
practice,,, ll Foucault tries to show that there are rules of formation for objects, concepts 
and theories which are autonomous from the intentions of the subject. He looks for rules 
put into operation through discourse "which explain why a certain thing is seen (or 
omitted); why it is envisaged under such an aspect and analysed at such a level." 12, 
Sartre, by contrast, had given a primary role to the radically free subject as the creator of 
negatites through which we give meaning to the world. It is the subject that has a role in 
shaping her perception from a position of free choice. By contrast, Foucault's 
archaeological model claims that rule-governed discourse is the primary source of 
meaning. Rather than positing the subject as the source of intelligibility, Foucault gives 
discourse this role. He thus puts aside the question of individual agency and desire, or 
intention, and looks at how the subject is in fact constituted by discourse. 
Foucault rejected the idea of any essential human nature which could be derived from 
experience and understood as the locus of knowledge, arguing "subjects do not first pre-
exist and later enter into combat or harmony; subj ects emerge on a field of battle and play 
their roles, there and there alone. ,,13 Subject positions are the effect of discourse. There is 
no subject prior to the discourse that constructs it. This position appears to contradict 
Sartre's notion of transcendental consciousness, which has a prior capacity to evaluate 
9 Foucault, M. "The Archaeology of Knowledge" in Foucault Live. 1989: 60. 
10 Foucault, M. "The Archaeology of Knowledge" in Foucault Live. 1989: 59. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid: 60. 
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given-being from the position of radical freedom. Not only is the subject inevitably 
situated, but also freedom itself is conditioned, such that there are meanings for Foucault 
that we cannot help but accept, since discourse is primary and autonomous. There is no 
authentic self to be liberated since the self is an effect of discourse. 14 Foucault claimed 
Sartre's project of autonomy "relies upon notions that are not invented by the individual, 
but which are models he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon 
him by his culture, his society, his social group.,,1 5 Foucault thus rejects the conception of 
an a-historical, free subject he finds in Sartre. 
Foucault argues that the subject is constructed in relation to the determining effects of 
discourse. The determining subject, as elucidated by Sartre, is said to be an illusory effect 
of discursive strategies that both subject man and subjugate man. Models such as 
Sartre's, which claim to be free from the instantiations of discourse, effectively 
perpetuate a normalizing image of man by neglecting to take a critical attitude towards 
these structures. With Archaeology, Foucault attempts a "de-centring that leaves no 
privilege,,16. This prevents the normalizing image of human nature perpetuated by 
phenomenological theories of the subject. Thus Foucault's Archaeology makes the 
constitution of subjectivity contingent to one's environment. 
Foucault's final word on the matter of existentialism is to be found in an interview he 
gave in the late 60's entitled, "The Birth of the World,,17: 
[By the death of man] I mean the death of the subject, of the Subject, in capital letters, of the 
subject as origin and foundation of knowledge (connaissanee), of Freedom, of Language, of 
History. One can say that all of Western civilization has been subjugated, and philosophers have 
only certified the fact by referring all thought and all truth to consciousness, to the Self, to the 
Subject ... We have to recognize the birth of a world where the subject is not one but split, not 
sovereign but dependent, not an absolute origin but a function ceaselessly modified. 
13 Ibid: 60. 
14 Armstrong, A. 2003: 10 
" Foucault, M.: 11. 
16 Foucault, M. Hereuline Barbin: Being the Recently Disclosed Memoirs of a 19'h Century French 
Hermaphrodite, 1976: 117. 
17 Foucault, M. "The Birth of the World" in Foucault Live. 1989: 67. 
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Archaeology 's aim was "to free history from the grip of phenomenology,,18 Foucault 
wished to free philosophy from its subjection to the transcendence of the knowing 
subject, to stress historical contingency. I will evaluate this structuralist critique with a 
detailed examination of Sartre' s ontology of consciousness in the following part of this 
chapter, but first let us allow Sartre his response. This will give an indication of how the 
issue of historicism comes to affect the development of F oucaul!' s thought in his later 
work following The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
Section Three: Sartre's response to Foucault and structuralism 
In seeking to overcome the primacy attached to theories of the subject in existential 
phenomenology, Foucault resorts to an impersonal language of discourse and strategy. 
He has admitted that by focusing on the determinations of discourse, he tended to neglect 
- until later in his work - an effective theorization of the free agency on which discursive 
and social forces are brought to bear. The complaint of many was that "there is a 
becoming that structural analysis will never account for, a progression which is ... made 
by a subject.,,19 This means that the determinations of discourse cannot be taken to exist 
outside of the activity of individuals and the consequent unfolding of history. This echoes 
Sartre's complaint that Foucault freezes history "by replacing the cinema with the magic 
lantern. ,,20 
Sartre responded to Foucault's attack on existentialism by criticizing him for attempting 
to constitute a new ideology, "the last rampart the bourgeoisie could raise against 
Marx ... ,,21 Sartre admits that Foucault's work takes an historical approach, 
uncharacteristic for structuralists who look for the a-historical structures underlying the 
progression of history, but criticises him for treating discourse as autonomous of human 
agency. The fact that discourse is the product of an event - speech - is overlooked by 
Foucault, anxious to avoid the analysis of discourse in terms of a philosophy of 
" Foucault, M . The Archaeology of Knowledge. 2003: 224 . 
" Foucault, M. "The Archaeology of Knowledge" in Foucault Live, 1989: 59. 
20 Sartre, JP. "Jean Paul Sartre Repond" in Michel Foucault (ed. Bany Smart). 1994: 73. 
21 Ibid. 
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consciousness, or a phenomenology of speech22 This echoes Ricouer' s complaint against 
structuralism, that it artificially separates language from speech, as if language is already 
constituted.23 
Discourse, argues Foucault, has a determining effect on the constitution of subjectivity. 
Yet his account of discourse fails to take into account the extent to which it takes effect 
amongst speaking subjects. Laclau and Mouffe make the point that the purely formal 
issue of discourse-construction as practiced in The Archaeology of Knowledge blocks 
consideration of the socially governed processes through which subject positions of 
discourse are filled. Archaeology explains the construction of subject positions, from the 
position of discourse but not the social context of discourse, involving different 
individuals interpreting their respective contexts in their individual ways. It fails to 
negotiate the interrelations between discourse and the socio-historical field24 Discourse 
is presented as autonomous, but this fails to explain how it comes about in the first place, 
or how it changes. 
Sartre's criticism points out that Foucault - in his rejection of humanism - fails to live up 
to his proclaimed historical perspective. By cutting discourse off from the subject, it is 
presented as if people coming from particular historical circumstances had never formed 
it. Sartre would deny one could free philosophy from any constituting activity on the part 
of the subject. Thus Foucault's archaeological work appears abstracted from historical 
contingency, just as he had criticized humanism for doing by presenting a universal 
account of subjectivity. Ironically, Foucault's structuralist project of overcoming the 
perceived a-historical approach of existential phenomenology, regarding universal 
theories of subjectivity, ends up relying too heavily on an artificial abstraction of the 
subject from historical discourse-determination. 
It is important to note that the characterisation I have offered of Foucault's Archaeology 
is not as clear-cut as it may seem. Foucault was aware of the problems of a-historicism I 
22 McNay, L. Foucault: A Critical Introduction. 1994: 83. 
23 Ricouer, P. in McNay, L. Foucault: A Critical Introduction. 1967: 78. 
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have discussed. His reply to these accusations levelled against his work is that he had not 
denied the possibility of changing discourse; that the set of rules he identified must not be 
understood as 'a set of determinations imposed from the outside on the thought of 
individuals,25 but rather as part of historical context of social existence. Discourse, he 
argued, is not a set of limitations imposed on the freedom of the subject as much as 'the 
field on which that freedom is articulated,26. Foucault claims merely to have deprived the 
sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to the determination of 
meaning. Yet regardless of this claim, this freedom of which he speaks at the end of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge nevertheless remains un-theorised. When it later surfaces, as 
we shall see in the following chapter, I will show that it looks a lot like Sartre's 
conception of freedom. 
Having considered Foucault's structuralist critique of existential phenomenology, I will 
now investigate the substance of this critique. Essentially, this will involve looking in 
detail at Sartre's ontology of consciousness. Foucault has criticized Sartre for placing a 
universal, radically free subject at the centre of meaning, for unifying the study of human 
experience under a model of the determinations of consciousness, and maintaining a 
Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. 
I begin with Sartre's problems with Husserl's phenomenology to show how he addressed 
these issues with his dialectical ontology of consciousness, with reference to Hegel and 
Heidegger's concerns with Being. This will give an indication of the substance of the "I-
subject" that Sartre was working with. I will then defend Sartre's ontology against the 
objections identified from Foucault's archaeological critique in the previous part of the 
chapter, principally in relation to the question, "What is the essence of the pre-discursive 
subject?" - what properties does Sartre give subjectivity, prior to the effects of the 
external environment which Foucault had given priority to in discourse? I want to show 
that, for Sartre, even 'pre-discursive' subjectivity is necessarily tied up in the world and, 
24 Lac\au, E and Mouffe, C. in McNay, L. Foucault - a critical introduction. 1994: 76. 
15 Foucault, M. The Archaeology o/Knowledge. 2003: 230. 
26 Ibid. 
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III doing so, I will demonstrate that his ontology in no way posits the dualistic 
transcendental subject targeted by Foucault's objections in his attack on humanism. 
PART II: SARTRE'S HISTORICIST ONTOLOGY 
How to theorize the individual agent of history, the basic, primary unit of society? How 
to extricate the subject from her world, prior to the determinations of her environment? In 
the next section I will be focusing on the work of Edmund Hussed to show how his 
phenomenological analysis of intentionality and transcendental subjectivity was 
confronted by Existentialist concerns with Being. I will thus relate his work to Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, and show Sartre brings together existentialism and 
phenomenology in a universal, yet historicist account of subjectivity, with the 
phenomenological ontology of Being & Nothingness. My concern here is to evaluate how 
Sartre addressed the problem historicism poses for Hussed 's phenomenology, so that I 
might address the perceived a-historicism Foucault sees in Sartre's work, in the following 
section. This objections will be revealed to be similar to that levelled by Sartre against 
Husser!' It is a problem that, in tum, Husserl had tried to address in relation to Descartes. 
I will thus begin by tracing the history of Husserl's phenomenological concerns, taken up 
from Descartes' dualistic model of a transcendental ego and Kant's consequent 
transcendental idealism. I will then discuss Nietzsche's radical reduction of the 
phenomenological to the ontological: my subjective experience is my existence. Husserl 
resisted what he saw to be Nietzsche's radically subjectivist, existentialist conclusions 
about historical contingency. This led him away from the non-dualistic model of 
intentionality of his early work to a later transcendental reduction to the a priori ego. 
Dualism, as I showed earlier, posits the mind as distinct from the body, allowing one to 
theorise a universal subject, distinct from the historically contingent empirical domain. 
Discussing Husserl ' s intellectual development will reveal the problem phenomenology 
faced in relation to the historicism of Existentialism, a problem that Sartre tried to 
overcome with his ontology of consciousness. Evaluating Sartre' s success in overcoming 
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these problems will enable us to decide what to make of Foucault's later criticisms 
against his "a-historical" subject, in the final section ofthis chapter. 
Section One: Husserl's Phenomenology 
The term phenomenology is related to a Kantian distinction between noumena and 
phenomena. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena, which are appearances, as 
opposed to objects in-themselves. Phenomenology puts ontology - the study of Being -
that which is - aside, and instead focuses on things as they appear to US27 
Phenomenology, thus, does not address the Existentialist question asked by Heidegger: 
What is the connection between this Being and Being (in general)? What can we know 
about Being through an analysis of the contingent Dasein? This question of ontology 
brings back the issue of external wor!d skepticism. Existentialism develops an account of 
the ontological characteristics of human being; Phenomenology takes up a solution to the 
problem of what can be known about being, offered by Kant, and focuses instead only on 
what is apparent. As Heidegger argues, "Phenomenology is thus precluded from any 
pronouncements about being which have specific content.,,28 As we will see with Husserl, 
however, the worry of the noumenal is never far from mind. Kant had developed an 
account of the conditions of thought which can be known a priori - prior, that is, to the 
contingencies of experience - which are the logical, transcendental, rational pre-
conditions for the intelligibility of phenomena. It is from this account that Husser! took 
his lead, to develop an account of the Transcendental Subject, known with certainty, prior 
to experience. 
Before discussing Husser!, however, it is important to consider Nietzsche' s attitude to the 
problem of a-historicism confronting phenomenology with its recourse to the universal 
characteristics of human being. Husserl wished to avoid certain existentialist conclusions 
about the contingency of being made by his predecessor. Looking at Nietzsche' s ideas 
27 Ricouer. 1967: 202. 
" I-Ieidegger, M. The Basic Problems a/Phenomenology. 1975: §5. 
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about the relativity of beliefs to phenomenal experience will help explain why Husserl 
took recourse to an account of transcendental sUbjectivity. 
Joseph Fell explains how Nietzsche - contrary to Husserl - takes the Kantian limitation 
of knowledge to the purely phenomenal to the logical conclusion of radical contingency. 
There is nothing universal in our experience and, since that is all we have, there is no 
ground for transcendental absolutes, which lie outside of experience. Nietzsche thus 
rejects Kant' s attempt to ground the conditions of our thought in a priori categories. For 
Nietzsche, appeals to transcendence devalue human experience, which is the actual 
grOlU1d of our beliefs29 . Sartre was to reiterate this later with the existentialist phrase, 
"Existence precedes Essence." The historical contingent experiences of human existence 
define what it is to be human. 
Nietzsche's "death of God" cuts our link to transcendence, leaving existence utterly 
contingent. There remains only the phenomenal realm, open to interpretation, with 
nothing universally fundamental beyond historically contingent interpretation. The 
radical contingency of experience is all we have to go on, in our projections towards the 
future. We discover that the mundane world of experience is, and has been, the source of 
meaning all along. The real source of value and meaning is man himself. Nietzsche 
argues that we should own up to this state of affairs, rather than seek refuge in the 
transcendent as a source of meaning and values30 "That things possess a constitution in 
themselves quite apart from our interpretation and subjectivity is a quite idle hypothesis: 
it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from 
its relationships would still be a thing.,,3l Arguing that the human subject necessarily 
interprets her environment in relation to historically contingent experience, Nietzsche 
disallows the transcendental subject he typifies in terms of the Kantian known, a priori, 
thing-in-itself32 - and hence undermines any pretensions of theories of the subject to a-
historical universality. 
29 Fell, JP. 1979: 14. 
30 Ibid: 15. 
31 Nietzsche, F. The Will 10 Power. 1967: 302-3. 
"Fell,JP. 1979: 16-17. 
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Husserl wanted to appeal to the authority of universality by means of a Kantian analysis 
of the necessary presuppositions of thought. This tactic would allow him to posit 
universal necessities for thought, which would in turn apply to all who think - that is, all 
people. Nietzsche would no doubt have criticized him for failing to appreciate the 
meaning of the death of God for epistemological foundations. Husserl thus related the 
concerns of phenomenology - the science of appearances - back to the theme of 
Descartes' philosophy: the method of doubt and the cogito. He re-developed Descartes' 
method of reduction to self-evident truths, taking the cogito as the primary field of 
phenomenological truth. The only truth that can be known is subjective, but this does not 
lead Husserl to relativist conclusions. Husser! rejected Nietzsche' s radical perspectivism 
to develop a universal model of consciousness on the basis of Transcendental 
Subjectivity . 
To begin with, however, the early Husserl gave little attention to transcendental 
subjectivity, concentrating instead on the phenomena of consciousness and developing 
Brentano's account of intentionality, which undermines the a priori distinction between 
the self and the objective world of experience. Intentionality describes consciousness as a 
relation between the subject and object of perception. Husserl effectively gave a critique 
of Cartesian dualism, by means of intentionality. In immediate given-ness, writes 
Husserl, one finds only intentionality: "We find nothing other than consciousness of ... -
consciousness in the broadest sense.,,33 Consciousness as intentional is "the basis of the 
pre-given world." 
The genuine intentional synthesis is discovered in the synthesis of several acts into one act, such 
that, in a unique manner of binding one meaning onto another, there emerges not merely a whole, 
but rather a single meaning in which these meanings themselves are contained. With the ensuing 
problems of correlation, lie the nrst beginnings of phenomenology.34 
The above quotation, whilst directed against the dualistic Cartesian conception of the ego 
and world, nonetheless intimates that the problems of phenomenology lie in addressing 
33 Husserl, E. Excerpts, Part IlIb: "The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy from 
Psychology". 1937: §8 
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how it is that objects of consciousness are unified through intentionality. Husserl tried to 
identify the intentional content of consciousness, to discover what is in the mind. Thus he 
developed - in Logical Investigations - the method of phenomenological reduction - the 
bracketing out of presuppositions. He asks, if all of consciousness is mere intentionality -
'consciousness of...' - how is it that various intentions relate back to one single 
consciousness? By reduction, intentionality's role appears constitutive. Intention relates 
the different perceptual experiences of a subject to the transcendent object in the act of 
perception35. Various perceptions ofa thing somehow relate to one another and refer back 
to it in its singularity. Such considerations about the unifying role of consciousness lead 
Husserl back towards the dualistic model of transcendental consciousness, that which is 
prior to and surpasses the empirical. 
In the beginning, however, Hussed retains a necessary ambiguity towards the question of 
the transcendent subject. In Logical Investigations, he writes that, "Nothing but the unity 
of connections between individual experiences is needed to account for the unity of 
conscious experience.,,36 Thus, in Logical Investigations, Husser! holds that perception is 
the primary act of consciousness37 The object appears to consciousness, thus 
transcending consciousness from beyond, yet the object is also in that consciousness 
(being intentional). This yields the paradoxical conclusion that consciousness is outside 
itself8. 
This account accords with Hussed's critique of psychologism, yet in the same work he 
writes that transcendental philosophy begins with the Cartesian Meditations as an attempt 
to ground philosophy in the subjectivism of the ego. "Absolute SUbjectivity constitutes 
everything that is, in its meaning and validity ... I, as transcendental ego, constitute the 
34 ibid. 
35 Warnock, M. 1970: 28-30. 
36 Husser!, E. Logical Investigations. 1970: 541. 
J7 Ricouer, P. 1967: 8. 
38 Ibid. 
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world, and at the same time I am an ego in the world.,,39 It is thus that he begins the task 
of isolating this a priori constituting subjectivity. 
In the Cartesian Meditations, Husser! began to give a bigger role to constituting 
consciousness. He adapted his phenomenological method, similar to Descartes' method 
of doubt, towards a deduction of the a priori conditions of constituting consciousness, not 
unlike Kant. From the purely formal description of consciousness as unifying 
intentionality, wherein Husser! abstained from any judgment beyond the mere appearance 
of phenomena, he moves towards a dualistic Transcendental Phenomenology, which 
involves the relating of the conditions of the appearance of things to the structure of 
human SUbjectivity, as is the case in Kant's transcendental idealism40 
Husser! thus derived a transcendental ego as the a priori condition of experience, by 
means of a phenomenological reduction. "The Cartesian ego exists, qua transcendental 
ego, independently of intuition, giving unity to all acts of consciousness, grasping the 
reality outside by means of consciousness.,,41 Thus consciousness as intentionality, 
unifying the subject and the object-world in a relation, is instead posited as subordinate to 
the activity of a transcendental ego. Husser! clearly saw no problem with an 'I' which 
perceives itself perceiving. This is something Sartre, however, explicitly rejects as 
absurd, as we shall see shortly. 
To be fair to Husser!, however, Ricouer's analysis does reveal how his later work goes 
some way towards undoing the idealistic tendencies of The Cartesian Meditations, 
implying recognition on the part of Husser! of the problematic dualism inherent in his 
account of the transcendental ego. This comes from taking on an existentialist concern 
with lebenswelt - the world in which we exist, which cannot be reduced since it exists 
prior to all reduction. "The being of the world is manifest in such a way that all truth 
39 Husserl, E. Excerpts, Part IIIb: "The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy from 
Psychology". 1937: §68. 
40 Ricouer, P. 1967: 203. 
" Husser, E. Excerpts, Part lIIb: The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy from 
Psychology. 1937: §68. 
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refers back to it," writes Ricouer42. "The world is pre-given in the sense that every 
present activity surges into a world that is already there. ,,43 We give shape to the world 
before us, but it is crucially before us. Such is the later discovery of Husserl, preparing 
phenomenology for its encounter with existentialism. The idealistic tendency of 
transcendental phenomenology is compensated for by the discovery that one does not 
constitute the originary but that one can only derive from it. The Lebenswelt cannot be 
reduced since it is a necessary pre-condition of consciousness. Thus consciousness cannot 
be isolated from existence the way Husserl tried to do in the Cartesian Medilal ions. It is 
thus that Husserl rediscovers intentionality: "Consciousness defined by its intentionality 
is outside, beyond. It ties its wanderings to the 'things ' to which it can apply its 
consideration, its desire, its action. ,,44 
Section Two: Sartre's Existentialist Critique of Husserl 
Despite these later insights on the part of Husserl, Sartre inherits from Husserl an 
'ontological bifurcation' - a divided being, to be solved by a Third Way - a non-dualistic 
ontology overcoming the subject-object divide45. Sartre makes use of Husserl's notion of 
intentionality but finds that Husserl has not overcome the dualism in being we find in 
Descartes, nor the idealism of Kant's transcendental ego. In The Transcendence of the 
Eg046, Sartre argues that Husserl's transcendental ego IS unnecessary for 
phenomenological analysis, claiming that the ego is a sedimented by-product of 
consciousness's engagement with the world, and not part of a constituting, a priori 
consciousness. He claims, "The ego is neither formally, nor materially in consciousness: 
it is outside, in the world.,,47 The'\' we encounter in consciousness does not unite our 
representations; rather, the unity of our representations makes the 'I' possible48 For 
Sartre, consciousness is unified by itself and its objects, rather than through a 
transcendental ego. 
42 Ricouer, P. 1967: 12. 
4J Ricouer, P. 1967: 205 . 
44 Ricouer, P. 1967: 204. 
" Fell, JP. 1979: 1. 
" Sartre, JP. The Transcendence of the Ego. 1990: 31. 
47 Ibid: 31. 
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Sartre thus reaffirms the doctrine of intentionality as an ongoing historical mediation 
between subject and objects. In contrast to Husserl's transcendental ego, Sartre develops 
an existentialist line towards phenomenology, arguing that existence precedes essence: 
"Man is not definable because to begin with he is nothing ... he will not be anything until 
later ... There is no human nature ... man simply is ... that is the first principle of 
existentialism ... ,,49 The being of man is tied to the historically contingent realm of 
existence, which depends on human evaluation. "Man is, before all else, something which 
propels itself towards a future, and is aware that it is doing so. ,,50 Sartre thus ties the 
phenomenological undertaking to a project of 'existentialist humanism': "the relation of 
transcendence as constitutive of man (in the sense of surpassing) with subjectivity 
(forever present in the human universe).,,51 With existential phenomenology, Sartre takes 
up Husserl's phenomenological method of analysis and relates it to the ontological 
concerns of Hegel and Heidegger, as I will now demonstrate in more detail. 
Heidegger had set out phenomenological research as a philosophical science preparatory 
to all philosophy, arguing that our environment, arising from two distinct elements, 
determines our world-view. Our environment is made up firstly, "of the particular factical 
existence of human being in accordance with the facti cal possibilities of thoughtful 
reflection and attitude-formation, for this factical Dasein.,,52. Sartre expressed this as our 
facticity. Secondly, our environment is determined by the "a priori, ontological 
characteristics of the human Dasein, which also determine his world-view.,,53 This Sartre 
expressed as our transcendence. "In the end something is given which must be given if 
we are to experience and understand any beings at all... ,,54 Following Heidegger, Sartre 
is interested in the a priori determinations of being, whilst insisting that they are situated 
in our experience of the world. How is this irreconcilable distinction to lead to a "Third 
Way"? 
48 Sukale, M. 1976: 12. 
49 Sartre, JP. Existentialism and Humanism. 1973: 12. 
so Ibid: 19. 
'1 Ibid. 
52 Heidegger, M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 1975: §2. 
SJ Ibid. 
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It is here that Sartre uses the resources of dialectical thinking, having been influenced by 
the Hegelian scholarship of his associate Jean Hyppolite. Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit [PS] was a major influence on many existentialist thinkers, and it is this influence 
that Sartre's phenomenological ontology adds to Husserl's phenomenology. According to 
Ricouer, "The negative announces the end of pure phenomenology ... The negative is the 
possibility of a system no longer of the analytic type, but of the dialectical type in which 
the negative mediates the becoming of spirit through its forms."ss Sartre posits the 
objective, constituting consciousness of Husserl as a nothing, a lack, freedom, unfulfilled 
desire, or, if you will, will. He thus makes an attempt to overcome dualist conclusions 
about consciousness and matter, positing consciousness as anti-thesis to matter in terms 
of nothing but nothingness, and drawing intentionality out as synthesising mind and 
matter. 
Because of intentionality, we are aware that consciousness is nothing but being conscious 
of something, yet this same intentionality implies freedom - the choice of intention. 
Freedom is re-discovered in Being, by Sartre, through absence. Freedom is revealed as 
the nihilation of being as thing-ness. Through my experience of absence, I find myself at 
a remove from the world of cause and effect. Thus Hegel's sense of the negative re-
emerges in philosophy with Sartre. I will demonstrate this in more detail in the following 
chapter on concrete social relations and being-for-others. At the primary level of 
perception, however, Sartre uses absence to link existence in the external world with free 
consciousness: the existential and the phenomenological. The being of man (the 
existential) consists in existing and negating being (consciousness). Thus, in Sartrean 
existential phenomenology, the a priori conditions of consciousness are posited as 
necessarily bound up in the world. As Ricouer puts it, "Husserl' s concept of 
intentionality takes on a new look after this bath in negativity."s6 Sartre's existential 
phenomenology makes the transition between transcendental phenomenology, born of the 
reduction of everything to its appearing to me, and ontology, which restores the question 
" ibid. 
" Ricouer. 1967: 206. 
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of the sense of being, for that which is said to ' exist'. Sartre took the step of identifying 
negation as our contribution to our existence. 
The question to be looked at next is whether Sartre succeeds in overcoming the problems 
he identified in Husserl's work. These problems are the same as those identified in the 
previous section by Foucault, namely that Sartre's transcendental subjectivity 
incorporates an a priori consciousness, at a remove from its external environment. In 
Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre makes some references that give credence to 
Foucault's interpretation. He begins his discussion of subjectivity by claiming, "At the 
point of departure, there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which 
is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself."s7 Does Sartre then have some 
notion of an a priori dimension to consciousness? Sartre claims that "there exist human 
conditions which define our fundamental situation"s8 yet he argues that these conditions 
are neither objective, nor subjective. Thus there is a universal human of condition for 
Sartre, although this condition is nothing if we do not live it. 
An Hegelian interpretation of Sartrean intentionality, I believe, helps to explain how 
Sartre takes account of the fundamental ambiguity of freedom in situation. In the final 
section of this chapter I will argue that Sartre' s conceptions of freedom and 
transcendental subjectivity avoid the dualistic model of the self and world to which 
Foucault accused him of succumbing. Sartre 's use of an Hegelian, dialectical model of 
consciousness in Being and Nothingness overcomes the antithetical dualism found in 
Husserl by means of a synthesis of these apparently irreconcilable realms. By making 
intentionality the locus of this synthesis, Sartre proves that "there is no sense in life a 
priori - life is nothing until it is lived."s9 In terms of intentionality, consciousness is 
consciousness of. .. My projects are necessarily bound up in the outside world. 
" Ibid: 21 I. 
57 Sartre, JP. Existentialism and Humanism. 1973 : 15. 
" Ibid. 
19 ibid. 
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PART III: CONSIDERING FOUCAULT'S OBJECTIONS 
We have seen that structuralism and existential phenomenology regard human experience 
from opposite positions. Whilst existential phenomenology takes its lead from Kant's 
investigation of the conditions of experience immanent in experience, structuralism 
presupposes nothing about the subject of experience. For structuralists, the unifying 
element of experience comes from our underlying discourse, which is independent of 
individual subjective intentions. Foucault' s call for the "death of man" is explicitly anti-
humanist. It is a rejection of the subject-centred discourse of existential phenomenology. 
What specifically, then, is the problem with Sartre's model of consciousness in light of 
these structuralist concerns? 
In Part I, we saw how Foucault's discourse-centred account of the determinations of 
human experience seems to be radically at odds with Sartre's consciousness-centred 
model of radical human freedom. Foucault rejects the idea of essential human nature, 
arguing that subjectivity and freedom are structured through history out of relations of 
power and knowledge. For Foucault, Sartre has failed to account for the fact that we are 
utterly contingent beings: who we are, is contingent upon the determinations of our 
experience of the world. Ironically, it was Sartre who captured the idea best, with the 
phrase, "Existence precedes essence. ,,60 
However, Foucault criticizes Sartre's conception of transcendent subjectivity for 
according consciousness a determining role as the unified centre of meaning, freely 
constituting the world around itself. For Foucault, freedom is historically contingent upon 
discourse, the conditions of powerlknowledge - there is no subject outside of discourse. 
This is argued to contradict Sartre's transcendent model of consciousness as radically 
free. I will start with this objection, showing that Sartre's conception of freedom is not as 
radically at odds with Foucault's approach as may first seem to be the case. In examining 
Sartre's distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent, I will argue that 
Sartre's 'pre-discursive' self is minimal enough to be consistent with Foucault' s model of 
60 Sartre, JP. Existentialism and Humanism , 1973: 3. 
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subjectivity in discourse. By addressing Foucault's objections, I will show that Sartre 
overcame the subject-object dualism in phenomenology he had inherited from Husser!, 
effectively historicizing everything about subjectivity except for our transcendent agency. 
Foucault's objections to Sartre's model of consciousness can be summarized in three 
relatively distinct issues questions concerning the status of subjectivity. Foucault 
questions (a) the freedom of the subject, (b) the notion ofa transcendental subject, and (c) 
the persistence of a Cartesian subject-object dualism he sees to be pervading Sartre's 
ontology. From these inter-related issues, I hope to derive the argument that Foucault's 
attack on Sartre' s ' a-historicism' is philosophically unjustified, given Sartre's 
interpretation of intentionality. 
A) Consciousness is Freedom - Intentionality and the Argument for Freedom 
Sartre believes we are essentially free. Such is the constituting consciousness of Sartre. 
While existence - our environment - may precede essence - who we are - we remain 
singular beings who are nonetheless different from our environment. By contrast, 
Foucault argues that we are entirely defined by our historically contingent existence, our 
context. In contradiction to Sartre's claim that we are necessarily free, prior to the 
contingent determinations of existence, Foucault believes that freedom itself is 
conditioned. We are not free to determine meaning, for instance. Rather, there are 
meanings we cannot but accept, given to us by discourse. In Discipline and Punish 
Foucault shows how autonomy is constructed by society to provide a normalizing image 
of man, to lend the determination of our subjectivity legitimacy, inducing self-policing 
regularity in our behaviour, thereby making us complicit in our own subjugation. The 
question to be asked is: what does our freedom consist off or Sartre? To what extent does 
he posit freedom as exterior to historical permutation? To answer this will involve 
analysing Sartre's argument for freedom, through an investigation of his 
phenomenological ontology. I will argue that freedom, for Sartre, is always historically 
situated through intentionality. 
24 
Similar to Foucault, Sartre is concerned with a world where historical contingency goes 
all the way down to being61 , even to existence itself. Everything that we are is affected by 
our historically contingent context. Yet he also argues that we are necessarily free. We 
call into question. Everything we do could have been otherwise, were it not for our 
conscious intentions62 I am my desire, my freedom. Against a transcendent background 
of being-in-itself, consciousness is for-itself. Sartre's existential phenomenology 
addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism through an Hegelian aufhebung: the 
dialectical synthesis of body and mind, self and world, being-for-itself and being-in-itself 
through intentionality, putting the subject in history. Interestingly, Hegel himself posits 
intentionality in perception as aufhebunl3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I will be 
giving an Hegelian reading of Sartre's ontology to explore its dialectical nature, and 
thereby overcome criticisms against Sartre, which abstract from the deliberate ambiguity 
in his conception of intentionality, which historicizes the phenomenology of the subject. 
Intentionality, for Sartre, can be explained by noting that we intend in two senses of the 
word: we intend towards (an object) and intend (to do so). Consciousness is the intending 
act itself. There is no substance to this intention other than that which is intended. My 
intention and that which I intend towards are thus brought together in the act of 
consciousness. It is thus that I am always already in the world; a world of my making 
which nonetheless transcends me. Freedom of intention is the basis of Sartre's ontology. 
It is our freedom that separates us from being-in-itself, the object of intentionality, that 
makes us for-ourselves, that breaks the chain of causality in the world outside us. Our 
freedom is necessarily prior to the exterior world, yet it is only takes effect in the world. 
With the dialectical concept of intentionality, Sartre claims that we are our intentions. All 
consciousness is consciousness ofan object,64 involving a bringing together of the subject 
and her world. Thus Sartre derives an historicist ontology of the subject. 
6i Martin, B. 2000: 10. 
"Flynn, T.1979: 160. 
63 The importance of this will become increasingly clear as this thesis progresses, given Sartre's rejection of 
dialectical aujhebung, as well as the post-structuralist attack on its teleological implications 
64 Morris, P. 1985: 181. 
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This synthesis of mind and body, self and world - through desire and its object -
conforms to Hegelian dialectical ontology. For Sartre, 'man's essence is his liberty,65. 
Primary consciousness, the pre-reflective 'Cartesian' ego is, essentially, not the object it 
intends towards, which is being-in-itself. This negation, however, involves the possibility 
of non-being66. The non-being of consciousness then, is the very source of its liberty. In 
breaking the chain of causality by the negating act of intention, intending this and that, 
consciousness is liberty. The argument is as follows: 
Firstly, every determination of consciousness is necessarily a negation of everything that 
is not its object, as explained by gestalt theory's figure-ground analysis of perception -
negation in perception involves focusing on somethinl7. Consciousness thus involves 
negation. Secondly, consciousness must know it is not that of which it is conscious. 
Consciousness is the source of the negation. Thirdly, we cannot make sense of our 
experience of absence in the world without reference to the role of consciousness in our 
experience. Negation cannot come from being-in-itself, since we do not perceive non-
being as the transcendent object of our intention. Thus negation must come from us. It is 
mind-dependent, as Locke put it in a similar context. Consciousness derives its power to 
negate from nowhere outside itsel~8. It is thus that Sartre can claim, "There is no 
difference between the being of man and his being free.,,69 Freedom comes from non-
being because non-being escapes causality. 
It can be seen that Sartre's ontology of consciousness is based on the freely chosen 
activity of negation. We exist as an irruption in the chain of being - in the determinations 
of cause and effect. Our intentions are determined by nothing but ourselves. We are free 
a priori. In terms of Foucauldian archaeology, our freedom is 'pre-discursive' - it takes 
effect prior to discourse. And yet our freedom, our will, intends towards its object. The 
object of consciousness is crucial in this ontology of freedom. While we may be free in 
our intentions, what we intend towards is already there before us. It is before us and prior 
65 Howells, C. 1988: 1. 
66 Salvan, 1. 1962: xxxiv. 
67 Martin, T. 2002: 49-51. 
" Howells, C. 1988: 15. 
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to us, 'transcending' us in a sense I will explain in more detail shortly. The object of our 
attention exists before us, and will persist despite our attention towards it. Being-in-itself 
does not depend on us for its being. We are superfluous to that towards which we intend. 
Our independence, one might argue, is dialectically related to its dependence on what is 
already given. 
Thus, for Sartre, freedom is necessarily situated in its historically contingent situation. 
Whilst we fundamentally negate, it is that which is exterior to us that, in our freedom, we 
negate. Contrary to Foucault's objection that Sartre's ontology of the subject is a-
historical, we find his dialectical concept of intentionality necessarily links consciousness 
to the contingent empirical domain. Consciousness has to assume the contingency of 
being-in-itself, since it has no foundation of its own. Such is our situation, our 'facticity' 
- the background against which we are free. "There is something like a primacy of the in-
itself over the for-itself. ,,7o Yet against the background of the situation in which we find 
our freedom, what do we consist of? We have seen Sartre speak of absences, present in 
the world of experience. What, then, is the role of consciousness in constituting the world 
of experience? This question brings us to the second objection we will discuss: 
Foucault's criticism of transcendental subjectivity in Sartre' s humanistic ontology. 
B) Sartre's Subject - Transcendental Ego, Transcendent Consciousness 
Foucault's second objection to Sartre is that his ontology takes recourse to a 
transcendental subjectivity. This is in fact the same objection Sartre had raised against 
Husseri. Sartre, too, is criticized for making the subject the source of all meaning for the 
individual, arguing that consciousness determines what is perceived, through negation, at 
a radical remove from determination. Foucault, on the other hand, argued that discourse 
is the primary source of meaning. Subjectivity is constituted by discourse according to 
disciplinary techniques and modes of subjectification. For Foucault, the self is given to 
69 Sartre, J. quoted in Salvan, 1962: 16. 
70 Ibid 
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us, and Sartre is said to have overlooked this by postulating a pre-discursive meaning-
giving subject. 
There is no ego in immediate consciousness for Sartre though. I cannot simultaneously 
reflect on myself reflecting while I am reflecting7). I cannot be both the subject and 
object of my experience, simultaneously, as Sartre points out in his critique of Husserl. In 
the act of intention, we are necessarily aware of that which we intend towards, but this 
implies that we are also not that towards which we intend. It is important to see here that 
there is no substance in this consciousness of myself to myself other than that I am not 
the object of my consciousness, which must be presupposed in the act of intention. The 
paradox here is that I nevertheless am consciousness, qua intention towards an object. 
Consciousness relies on a distance (Heidegger's 'clearing') between it and itself72 It is 
unable to intend towards an object without engaging in the self-conscious act of negation 
of the world, and thus, paradoxically, the substance of consciousness is necessarily of the 
world. In contrast to Descartes and Husserl' s methods of reduction, Sartre argues, "It is 
not in some hiding place that we will discover ourselves; it is on the road, in the town, in 
the midst of the crowd." 73 
From this understanding of consciousness, we see that consciousness must be aware of 
itself. There must be a self that is conscious. Thus, despite consciousness being 
intentionality towards an object, we derive Foucault's objection that Sartre has smuggled 
a pre-discursive interiority into his model of consciousness. It seems he has posited a 
fundamental, universal subjectivity, which is a priori aware of itself qua consciousness. I 
will explain why this is not the case by looking at the distinction between positional and 
non-positional, pre-reflective and reflective, consciousness, as well as the Sartrean 
distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental . The minimal self, 
presupposed in the activity of consciousness, I will argue, is far from transcendental; 
entirely insubstantial, in fact, if abstracted from its 'exteriority'. 
7\ Salvan, J. 1962: 26. This would imply an infmite regression. Logically, I can only reflect on myself in the 
~ast tense 
2 Martin, T. 2002: 6. 
73 Sartre, JP. Existentialism and Humanism. 1973: 5. 
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Phyllis Morris gives an excellent account of Sartre's distinction between consciousness 
and the self. Pre-reflective consciousness - all intention - as I have shown, involves both 
positional consciousness of the object, as well as non-positional consciousness of itself 
not-being the object of which it is conscious74. This, crucially, is not the ego, but simply 
an awareness of one's necessary distance from the object of perception. There is, 
however, a secondary type of consciousness, which is reflective. This comes about when 
consciousness takes itself as the object of its own reflection. Owing to the impossibility 
of being both subject and object of one's consciousness simultaneously, the self, 
encountered by consciousness, is necessarily at a remove from consciousness. Man's 
essence is always historical, "always what has-been,,75 In the present, we always already 
transcend the historically conditioned self, which we perceive, which in turn transcends 
us. Contrary to Foucault, the transcendent ego, for Sartre, is an historical product of 
consciousness, and thus cannot be consciousness itself since consciousness involves a 
necessary lack, a non-being. Consciousness "is not what it is,,76. 
The distance between conscIOusness and itself is best explained by looking at the 
differences between Sartre' s use of the terms transcendence and transcendental. The 
"transcendental" is the necessary condition of all experience - i.e. constituting 
consciousness. This does not entail a transcendent ego, an ego which transcends historical 
contingency, but rather the intrinsic capacity of consciousness to go beyond what is 
given77, that is - to transcend its situation as seen in our discussion of freedom. The 
transcendent, on the other hand, refers to that which is given. Since consciousness has no 
content, the objects of consciousness transcend it - they don't disappear when we turn 
our attention away from them78. To complicate matters, the ego is transcendent in this 
sense. The ego does not reflect - is not conscious - but rather is the history of one's 
conscious activity, posited on reflection, by reflecting consciousness. The transcendent 
ego amounts to character, personality, essence - the product of conscious intention; it is 
74 Morris, P. 1985: 181. 
" Salvan, J. 1962: 20. 
76 Ibid: 25 . 
77 Morris, P. 1985: 182. 
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an historical object that transcends transcendental consciousness. The subject is thus both 
in-itself and for-itself. 
Foucault criticised Sartre for providing an account of transcendental subjectivity. Yet we 
see in the above account that in intention, Sartre' s transcendental consciousness has no 
other content than non-positional awareness of itself and the object of its intention. The 
transcendent ego, on the other hand, is the product of determination, of transcendental 
consciousness and its situation. Sartre's subject is, then, in history, despite what Foucault 
argued, and is compatible in this light with Foucault' s own idea of subjectivity. 
Consciousness, although prior to the determinations of history, is nothing but what it 
intends, and the awareness that it is not that. Sartre does not describe a transcendental 
consciousness that constitutes the world79 There is transcendental consciousness, but you 
can't say much about it, other than that it negates of its own accord. On the other hand, 
the transcendent ego that is encountered on reflection is an historical object, rather than a 
subject. The reflecting consciousness is itself always un-reflected. Consciousness is 
neither ego, nor substance. The subject, reflecting, is never encountered; it encounters. 
We see that Foucault' s objection abstracts unfairly from the ongoing, historical synthesis 
of intentionality. 
C) Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself: Dualism, or Ambiguity? 
For Foucault, Sartre's existential phenomenology is marked by the same Cartesian 
subject-object dualism that Sartre had tried to overcome in addressing Husser!. Being-for-
itself remains radically distinct from being-in-itself, transcendence from facticity. For 
Foucault, the subject and object cannot be regarded as radically distinct from each other. 
Each term is irreducible to any essential abstraction from its Siamese twin. The subject is 
composed of the world it takes as its object, and this world is composed of human terms 
that shape it, such as through discourse. While, for Sartre, the subject and object are 
separately identifiable terms, Foucault rejects this distinction. Foucault collapses the 
78 Ibid: 183. 
79 Consciousness, for Sartre, is shaped by the world, yet from its position of freedom 
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distinction between subject and object, denying that either is free from the historical 
determinations of discourse. There is no exterior-interior to the subject, for Foucault. 
What for Sartre is a unifying subject, for Foucault serves merely as a vehicle for 
discourse, with nothing in and of itself. 
Sartre, on the other hand, is said to perpetuate the Cartesian dualism he was attempting to 
rid philosophy of. While maintaining, contra Husser!, that the ego is an imaginary 
constructSO, Sartre attempted to continue the phenomenological method of bracketing off 
the contingently personal, determining the essence of the structures of consciousness, and 
identifying being-for-itself at a radical remove from being-in-itself. I argue, however, that 
our fundamental intentionality overcomes the radical separation of subject and object, 
transcendence and historical context. My dialectical analysis of being-in-itself and being-
for-itself will demonstrate that the two are co-constitutive. Sartre can have freedom and 
yet still maintain that man is in the world, immersed in history. The necessary ambiguity 
of the structure of consciousness accommodates Foucault despite his objections. 
Being-in-itself - that is our facticity. Being-in-itself can be taken as the thesis in Sartre's 
dialectical model of intentionality. Being-in-itself is that which we intend towards. For 
consciousness to be ' consciousness of... ' , it must be conscious of something which 
transcends it. Consciousness is not a thing, but it is always conscious of things. 
Consciousness involves facing "a full and concrete presence which is not 
consciousness."sl Thus being-in-itself is that to which consciousness clings from its 
nothingness. It is the 'content' of consciousness, the stuff of the wor!d around me. Being-
in-itself is substance, whereas being-for-itself is nothingness. Being-for-itself is my 
transcendence. It can be taken as the anti-thesis in the model of consciousness as 
intentionality. Being-for-itself is the intention of intentionality, the intention to posit the 
object of consciousness - being-in-itself. The poles of the structure of consciousness are 
thus irreducible - the one being material, the other immaterial. 
80 Howells, C. 1988: 2 or find the original in transcendence of ego 
81 Salvan, J. 1962: 6. 
31 
However, as I argued in my discussion of his phenomenological and existentialist 
background, Sartre posits a necessary ambiguity between being-for-itself and being-in-
itself. He thus overcomes the anti-thetical dualism, which plagued Husser!, by positing 
mind as negation and referring it to matter through the mediating role of intentionality. 
Sartre thus achieves a Third Way between the two, which overcomes the Cartesian 
dualism, which his model of consciousness addressed. Whilst Sartre was critical of 
Hegel's conception of synthesisS2, as I will show in more detail in the following chapter, I 
believe this resulted from his misunderstanding the notion of synthesis as an overcoming 
of difference, rather than an ongoing becoming through the interplay of difference. The 
terms of synthesis do not cancel each other out. This interpretation of dialectical synthesis 
involves uniting being-for-itself and being-in-itself, such as we in fact find in Sartre's 
conception of intentionality. The trace of thesis and anti-thesis always remain in synthesis 
for Hegel. Similarly, in the synthesis of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, the 
irreconcilable is reconciled; the antinomy, undone, remains, yet no longer in abstract, 
isolated terms. It is through the relational activity of consciousness - intentionality - that 
my necessary, transcendent freedom is brought into context in the historically contingent 
material world, and that the world is brought to me. 
Sartre's subject is thus free and essentially distinct from the world in which it acts. In 
some sense, there is a given-ness of desire, of freedom, to human nature, which we 
cannot escape, and which escapes - or rather, transcends - the determinations of 
envirorunent. It seemed that Sartre succumbed to precisely the sort of dualism to which 
he objected in the work of Husserl. However, an analysis of his ontology reveals the very 
structure of the subject to be dialectically bound up in both transcendence and facticity. 
Sartre's transcendental subject is absolutely minimal. What is given, prior to our 
experience of the world around us, is that we are free. However, this freedom is 
meaningless without a world in which it can be exercised, without an object of desire. 
There is no substance to our freedom apart from the choices we make in relation to our 
82 For example, in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre speaks of the synthesis of race as defmed by racists, and race 
as celebrated by those racialised (an anti-thesis to the racist thesis), as if this would entail mutual annulment 
in a race-free society (hence seeing synthesis as an overcoming of opposition rather than the ongoing, 
mutual co-constitution of the terms in becoming (Sartre, J. Anti-Semite and Jew. 1948: 37). 
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factual situation. Sartre's minimal self escapes the charge of dualism made against it by 
Foucault. We can maintain Foucault's line on the historical construction of the subject 
without having to reject Sartre's account of freedom. In fact, in the following chapter on 
relations with others, I will show that Foucault's account of power relations can be 
defended against objections to its apparent determinism in terms of Sartre's conception of 
freedom. Sartre' s ontology and Foucault's pre-suppositions will be seen to coincide. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RELATIONS OF POWER 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of dialectical intentionality (which shows 
how subjectivity is constituted in intentional relations with one' s environment, at a 
fundamental ontological level) that I use in this thesis to motivate an argument for 
historicism in political philosophy. It also revealed a problem with Foucault's 
structuralist methodology, shown up in the debate between Foucault and Sartre. In this 
chapter I will show how Foucault overcomes the a-historical 'discourse-determinism' of 
Archaeology to develop an account of historically contingent, inter-subjective power 
relations in his later work. Having given an historicist ontology of the subject's 
intentional relations with her world in the previous chapter, this chapter will present an 
historicist ontology of social relations, i.e. power. I return to my analysis of the relations 
between the work of Sartre and Foucault to explain how freedom is constituted in 
relations of power. 
I clarify Foucault's conception of freedom by appealing to Sartre' s account of radical 
freedom in the transcendent subject's relations with others, given a dialectical 
interpretation. I will argue for a particular interpretation of Hegelian synthesis (as 
ongoing), in order to suggest a way around the impasse of social conflict inevitably 
generated by transcendent subjectivity in Sartrean ontology by means of an historicist 
account. This dialectical reading will serve to defuse objections to the coherence of 
Foucault's conception of freedom being necessarily implicated in relations of power. 
Dialectical analysis of being-for-itself and being-for-others gives rise to an immanent 
critique oflogical identity that uses temporality to explain how the freedom of Foucault's 
subject of resistance is maintained in the face of the omnipresence of power. The chapter 
concludes with the establishment of an historicist ontology of power, which I will use in 
the final chapter to defend Foucault's epistemology, in which knowledge is said to be 
historically generated in relations of power. 
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Section 1: Foucault on Power 
To recap, the last chapter amounted to a defence of the Sartrean subject against 
Foucault's complaint of a-historical transcendence, of a universal subject that transcends 
the historical contingency of existence. Conversely, Sartre attacked the a-historical 
treatment of structure in Foucault's archaeological work, arguing, in sympathy with 
Ricouer, that Foucault's structuralism neglects to theorize the speaking subject of 
discourse. In this chapter, I will the two theorists together, to show how Foucault 
addressed these Sartrean concerns, shifting away from the discourse-centred approach of 
Archaeology, by theorising subjectivity in terms of productive power. Discipline and 
Punish shows how individuals are strategically 'subjectified' according to disciplinary 
norms. This shows how, ontologically, the subject is inextricably bound up in historically 
contingent relations of power. 
I begin with Foucault's account of power and resistance to explain the theorisation of 
productive, rather than purely repressive, power in Foucault's later work. Foucault argues 
that the starting point of any analysis of power relations is the identification of points of 
resistance. Power can only be described in terms of ongoing relational strategies, not 
from the point of view of discrete agents repressively directing power against the pre-
existing freedom of other agents. This brings me to the objection by Slavoj Zizek that 
Foucault's respective conceptions of resistance as a product of power and the freedom of 
the subject of resistance are irreconcilable83 . This is similar to Taylor's objection that 
resistance, or liberation, is incoherent if the subject is always already in relations of 
power. This section thereby introduces the problem the chapter is intended to solve. By 
demonstrating that Foucault's account of the subject of resistance is compatible with his 
account of subjectivation, I will establish an historicist ontology of politically constituted 
inter-subj ectivity 
83 Zizek, s. 1999: 255. 
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Sartre's objection in the prevIOus chapter revealed Foucault's mistake in The 
Archaeology of Knowledg/4, to treat discourse a-historically, as independent of the 
constituting activity of subject, in his attempt to avoid recourse to meaning-giving, 
autonomous subjectivity. "Archaeology's aim," he argued, "was to free history from the 
grip of phenomenology,,,S5 Suspicious of the notion of the centred subject as a source of 
intelligibility in philosophy, Foucault looked instead at how discourse constitutes 
subjectivity. His anti-humanist manifesto is summed up at the end of the Archaeology of 
Knowledge: "You may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said, but 
don't imagine that, with all you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than 
he."s6 This echoes Nietzsche's declaration 100 years earlier that atheism entailed the loss 
of universal philosophical foundations, exposing theory to the contingency of historical 
flux. The subject, argued Foucault, is no substitute for the universal intelligibility once 
granted by God. 
However, in Power/Knowledge, Foucault admits, "I confused the effects of power on 
statements (the discursive regime) too much with systematicity,,,S7 informed by an 
opposition between the content of historical events and the independent structure of form-
giving discourse. Moving on from structuralism, he argued, "One's point of reference 
should not be the great model of language and signs, but... war and battle."ss Meaning is 
not stable or systematic, but rather, is derived from ongoing historical contestation. To 
clarify, in an interview in Foucault Livl9 he argues that his previous conception of 
power was too close to a simplistic, uni-directional concept of power as an essentially 
negative legal instrument of repression. He reveals in Discipline and Punish, that power 
is also productive, not purely negative, viewing power as a relation of forces : "All 
relations of force imply a power relationship.,,9o Power is no longer conceived of in terms 
84 As Dreyfuss & Rabinow demonstrate, and Foucault himself admits, in Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics. 
" Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, 2003: 224. 
86 Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, 2003: 232. 
87 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980: 113. 
88 ibid. Foucault's frequent use of this metaphor emphasizes the oppositional antagonism of power relations 
89 Foucault, M. Foucault Live, 1989: 207. 
90 Foucault, M. Foucault Live, 1989: 21 I. 
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of sovereign power, but productive power. Discipline and Punish demonstrates how 
subjects are constituted through 'a multiplicity offorces,91 
Foucault's account of power is not one in which a 'sovereign, central spirit', such as the 
state, holds power which it wields over others. Productive power takes its shape from a "a 
myriad of bodies constituted as subjects through power.,,92 Productive power incites us to 
choose certain norms, harnessing the will, rather than preventing us from transgressing 
norms by denying the will. Productive power does not repress, but rather directs, human 
freedom. Power is not about one person or group's consolidated domination; it is 
something continually circulating. Power is employed through a net-like organization, 
with individuals both undergoing and exercising it. "Individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application.,,93 They are both the effect of productive power and 
the elements of its articulation, not merely the elements who exercise power or over 
whom power is exercised. 
This relational aspect of power is important to keep in mind when we try to reconcile the 
subject of power with the subject of resistance shortly. Foucault states that, "Relations of 
power are strategic relations. Every time one side does something, the other one responds 
by deploying a conduct, a behaviour that counter-invests it, tries to escape it, diverts it, 
turns it back against itself, etc. Thus nothing is ever stable in these relations of power.,,94 
Again: "Each offensive on one side serves as leverage for a counter-offensive from the 
other.,,95 These struggles go on indefinitely96. Modes of actions allow for possibilities of 
resistance and counter-attack on either side. Foucault takes the Nietzschean view that 
power is not fundamentally repressive, but rather a relationship, involving 'a hostile 
engagement of forces ,97. Power exists only in action, a relation of forces. It is not, as 
conceived by the liberal tradition in political philosophy, "a concrete thing which 
91 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980: 97. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid: 98. 
"Foucault, M. Foucault Live, 1989: 143. 
"Foucault, M. Power Knowledge, 1980: 163 . 
96 This is why Foucault believes he is working in an anti-Hegelian framework (Power/Knowledge: 56), 
betraying a teleological conception of the dialectic foreign to the interpretation I have given 
97 Foucault, M . Power Knowledge, 1980: 90. 
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everyone has, whose partial or total cession enables the establishment of political 
power,,98. It is struggle. 
The following quote from The Will to Knowledge99 stresses this relational characteristic 
of power: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in 
a position of exteriority in relation to power ... The strictly relational character of power 
relationships ... depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance ... These points of resistance are 
present everywhere in the power network ... Resistances ... are the odd term in relations of power, 
they are inscribed in power as an irreducible opposite. 
Foucault wanted to resolve the problems of the constitution of subjectivity within an 
historical framework, rather than the universal transcendental framework of 
phenomenology. He dispensed with the constituting subject to see how the subject is 
historically constituted IOo• Repressive powerlOI is expensive and fragile, producing too 
much resistance. Productive power is exercised more subtly through such techniques as 
surveillance. Surveillance involves little expense. There is no need for arms, physical 
violence, material constraints; only a gaze, "an inspecting gaze which each individual 
under his own weight will end by interiorising to the point where he is his own overseer, 
each individual exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself."I02 This is the 
exercise of power from within, rather than from above the social body. Modem 
techniques of power are more productive, more individualized, more efficient than forced 
tolerance.I03 Individuals are always historically embedded in power relations: 
Subjects do not fIrst pre-exist and later enter into combat or harmony; subjects emerge on a fIeld 
of battle and play their roles, there and there aloneI04 
98 Ibid: 88. 
99 I.e. History of Sexuality Vo.ll, 1978: 96-97. 
100 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980: 117. 
101 What one might caU "Power by force" although this would be to confuse the broader Nietzscheanl 
Foucauldian conception of 'force' as a basic element ofwiU, as opposed to forced tolerance 
102 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980: 155. 
IOJ Ibid: I 19. 
104 Dreyfuss & Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 1982: 109. 
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Section 2: The Absent Subject? A Humanist Stand-in 
To introduce the objection to Foucault's conception of freedom, the above remarks on 
power and resistance appear, at first glance, to be inconsistent. From Foucault we get an 
idea of the individual as saturated with power relations. Subjectivity is constituted within 
a field of power relations to the extent that no part of the subject is left unaffected. 
Modem techniques of subjectification create individuals so thoroughly imbued with 
power relations that they 'voluntarily subrnit105 , to productive norms of behaviour 
required of them by a generalized non-subjective intentionality at work in the power 
matrix. While Foucault insists on a co-constitutive relation between force and resistance, 
Zizek objects106 that Foucault' s rejection of transcendent freedom renders the notion of 
resistance incoherent. Where is the space for freedom to resist if the subject is thoroughly 
implicated in relations of power? Where disciplinary norms constitute the subject, 
resistance becomes hard to explain. 
Taylor's critique of Foucault's conception of power, points to a similar problem. He 
accuses Foucault of incoherence on the subject of resistance107 Taylor argues that 
Foucault' s critique of disciplinary technologies links power to liberation and freedom, but 
there is no ground for either liberation or critique if we are always already subjected to 
power relations. Taylor questions the coherence of Foucault's assertion that, "Power is 
exercised over free individuals, insofar as they are free. . . Freedom is the condition for 
the exercise ofpower"I08, given the ubiquity of power relations and inextricable relations 
between power and the constitution of subjectivity. 
What characteristics are required of the sort of subject of resistance that would satisfY the 
requirements Zizek and Taylor demand of Foucault? The problem goes deeper than 
elucidating a subject who might resist the myriad forces of power effected against it, in 
Foucault's accounts of psychiatric and disciplinary practices for example. In fact, one 
lOS ' voluntary ' is ironic given the lack of agency implied by such submission 
106 Zizek, S. 1999: 260. 
107 Taylor, C. in Wisnewski, J. 2000: 420. 
lOS Foucault, M. "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfuss & Rabinow: 221 . 
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might argue that by Foucault's account, there is in effect no agent to speak of. If each 
individual is constructed in relation to the social and political forces around her, where is 
there room for the interiority of a subject of resistance? 
I venture to suggest that two humanist sympathies affect one's reading of Foucault. 
Despite his rejection of humanism, they colour one's approach to his writing in a manner 
one suspects not unintended. Firstly, the situations he describes offend our sense of 
autonomy. We do not like to feel that the decisions we think we make are the net effect of 
an insidious matrix of power. Furthermore, we tend to imaginatively infer a, perhaps 
suppressed, autonomy on the part of the individuals affected by such power mechanisms. 
Yet if we take Zizek and Taylor's objections seriously, and Foucault himself for that 
matter, his account of subjectivity gives no ground for such imagined autonomy. What is 
lost in the process of subjectification if freedom is a construct? Foucault, it would seem, 
is not entitled to the outrage he affects with his discourse. Such outrage appeals to the 
very autonomy one expects from the sort of humanist account of subjectivity he rejects. 
For the purposes of this chapter I will assume that Sartre's humanist account of a 
radically free subject will suffice to meet the requirements Zizek and Taylor find lacking 
in Foucault. Sartre's humanist account of subjectivity posits being-in-itself as radically 
exterior to being-for-itself. He presents us with a classic humanist subject whose 
ontological freedom is the very basis of its means to resist external forces. Sartre's 
subject embodies humanist characteristics, in that its freedom transcends the historical 
contingency of power relations, as a pre-condition for power relations. Desire's positing 
of absence, in intention, is the basis of the for-itselfs radical alterity from that which is 
in-itself, a break in causality. Our freedom to choose, for Sartre, is the foundational 
platform for the constitution of the subject. In contrast to the saturated nodal point of 
power relations constituting Foucault's subject of resistance, as objected to by Zizek and 
Taylor, Sartre's subject is precisely not that to which it exists in relation. The autonomy 
entailed by such alterity is the basis of human freedom to which Sartre appeals in his calls 
for resistance against oppression, yet he takes into account the historicism that Foucault is 
anxious to maintain. It is the transcendence required of a humanist account of the subject, 
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which must be emphasized if freedom of resistance is to be secured, yet this need not 
override the historical contingency of subjectivity Foucault wants to emphasise. 
In the following section I wish to examine Sartre's account of subject in relation to others 
in Being & Nothingness to draw out the implications of radically transcendent individual 
freedom existing in the context of social relations. Sartre's account of the subject 
embodies the freedom against which power can be seen as an imposition. I use a 
dialectical critique of logical identity to help reconcile Sartre's humanist account of 
subjectivity with Foucault's account of resistance. This will enable me to defend Foucault 
against the sort of objections made by Zizek and Taylor as well as demonstrate how 
Foucault's theorisation of productive power takes into account complaints against the a-
historical treatment of discourse evident in his The Archaeology of Knowledge, discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
Section 3: On Concrete Relations with Others 
Let us examine Sartre's account of being-for-others and concrete modes of relations with 
others in the third part of Being & Nothingness. To reiterate the argument for freedom in 
the previous chapter, Sartre believes in the radical transcendence of self-consciousness in 
terms of its non-being. Consciousness, for Sartre, is the irruption of non-being in the 
world. This primary feature of consciousness is the ground of its freedom, since 
consciousness is essentially that which breaks the causal chain of given-being. 
Consciousness is precisely the moment of non-determination, the questioning of the 
object of perception for example. We are free because we lack being. We are always 
engaged in the ongoing historical process of becoming. Consciousness is what it is not, 
and is not what it is. 109 For Sartre, our interiority can never be reconciled with exteriority 
in an inclusive synthesis 110 Yet while being-for-itself is distinct from being-in-itself, this 
distinction is threatened by the intrusion of the other. 
109 Being & Nothingness [hereafter B&NJ, 1956: 617 
110 Butler, J. 1987: 121. 
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Being-for-others is the mode of being of the for-itself existing as an object for another 
consciousness. The for-itself, in the encounter with the other, sees the other as a 
subjectivity, which she is not, a subjectivity that objectifies her. This objectification by 
the other, in the original relation with the other of being-seen, is best explained in Sartre ' s 
example of the voyeur:!!! We imagine a man standing alone on a landing, looking 
through a keyhole. In this moment, the man's focus is directed outward. He is enthralled 
by the object of his gaze, lost in the scene, unaware of himself, engaged on an 
unreflective level of consciousness as pure being-for-itself. However, the situation 
changes abruptly when the voyeur hears footsteps in the hall. Suddenly, he feels shame, 
aware of himself as the other sees him - alone, looking through the keyhole. It is in this 
moment of being-seen, through the gaze of the other, that one becomes aware of oneself 
as an object amongst others, centred on a for-itself that is not oneself. Under the gaze of 
the other, I am no longer the referential centre of my world. The other is perceived as a 
subject for whom I am an object. This affects my reflective consciousness by making me 
aware of myself as an object amongst others. "I am conscious of myself as escaping 
myself, not that I am the foundation of my own nothingness but that I have my 
foundation outside of myself."ll2 Let us examine the implications this has for self-
consciousness - being-for-itselfs consciousness of itself. 
At this stage of Sartre's account of being-for-others a question arises which has crucial 
bearing on the self-other relation. Describing the de-centring of subjectivity under the 
gaze of the other, Sartre writes, "I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential 
modification appears in my structure.,,1l3 What does this modification entail for the 
structure of the for-itself? The question is whether a) relations with others playa role in 
the constitution of subjectivity, or whether b) these are relations in which pre-constituted 
subjects engage. Sartre's theory of transcendent consciousness seems to rule out the 
former option, as it might undermine transcendence. The meaning of the 'hostility' 
implied in the gaze of the other is that it strips me of my transcendence, thus threatening 
111 Sartre, JP. B&N, 1956: 259-260. 
112 Ibid: 75. 
11 3 Ibid: 260 [my emphasis] 
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my subjectivity and limiting my freedom 1 14 Yet Sartre maintains an ontological priority 
of the for-itself in the relation with the other. The subjectivity of the other eludes me, "it 
is separated from me by a nothingness I cannot fill,,115 To recall the concept of 
intentionality considered in the first chapter, wherein being-for-itself is the nothingness, 
the desire, the intention behind the positing of an object of consciousness, which it is 
notl16. Intention brings together being-for-itself and being-in-itself, the subject and her 
environment. The other cannot see as I do , but, conversely, nor can I see myself as the 
other sees me. Thus my freedom is contextualized by her recognition of me. Hence the 
radical alterity of being-for-itself is situated in the context of social relations. 
Sartre insists on the transcendence of being-for-itself, in the context of relations with 
others. "If in general there is an other, it is necessary above all that I be the one who is 
not the other, and it is in this very negation effected by me upon myself that I make 
myself be and that the other arises as the other.,,117 Being-for-itself is the primary 
ontological structure of self-consciousness - and, "it would perhaps not be impossible to 
conceive of a for-itself which would be wholly free from others.,,11S At what level then 
does the other 'strip me of my transcendence'? How does the other's gaze threaten my 
subjectivity? In order to grasp the ambiguity of the meaning of this 'modification' that 
'appears in my structure' under the gaze of the other, it is the secondary mode of 
consciousness we need to look at, namely reflective consciousness. This is the 
transcendent, historically generated self, reflected on by in conscious intentionality, 
whereby one perceives oneself, qua being-in-itself. 
If the other changes my mode of being from being-for-itself to being-for-another, 
alienating me from the transcendent freedom that I am, and yet I am ontologically free, 
then it must be in the nature of my self-as-object that the ' modification' appears. 
Reflective consciousness is consciousness, conscious of itself. The object of this mode of 
reflection is the transcendent self, which the illustration of the voyeur reveals to be 
114 Martin, T. 2002: 97-8. 
11 5 Sartre, JP. B&N. 1956: 261. 
11 6 i.e. non-reflective consciousness 
117 Ibid: 283. 
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subject to the scrutiny of others. So it is not at the level of unreflective intentional 
enthralment with the object of consciousness, but rather the level of self-consciousness, 
that one is affected by the regard of others. The self I reflect upon is shaped by the regard 
I imagine others might have of me. This reflective knowledge, I have of myself, is 
continually historically modified by my ongoing relations with others. Ongoing historical 
social relations, by way of their effect on my self-regard thus necessarily affect my 
subjectivity. Thus Sartre shows that relations with others playa role in the historical 
constitution of subjectivity, yet maintains the ontological priority of transcendent 
freedom. The subject, in relations with others, is constituted, in part, by these relations, as 
is the case with Foucault' s conception of relations of power. 
It is the historicisation of ontology that Sartre' s account of social relations makes clear. 
Sartre in fact argues that a subj ect, "which would exist without even suspecting the 
possibility of being an object.. . simply would not be a 'man",119. "My being-for-others as 
the upsurge of my consciousness into being has the character of an absolute event... a 
prehistoric historicisation," but, "it is as fact - as a primary and perpetual fact - not as an 
essential necessity that we shall study being-for-others.,,12o We study human beings who 
exist amongst the historical contingencies of social relations, yet we can nonetheless posit 
a universal condition of being-for-itself entailed in the nothingness behind intentionality. 
Thus Sartre avoids the a-historical synthesis of interiority and exteriority in his account of 
relations with others. We are who we are because of our ongoing social relations, but we 
are also not what we are. At the primary level of non-reflective consciousness, our 
transcendent freedom remains untouched. This is important: at the level of ontological 
abstraction from the ongoing becoming of social and historical existence, we are 
fundamentally free, yet from the primary act21 of intention to more complex 
interrelationships with others, this primary ontological freedom is shaped by the historical 
118 Ibid: 282. 
119 Ibid. 
120 ibid: 282-3. It is important to bear in mind here that, for Sartre, existence precedes essence, the 
existentialist argument from Heidegger that the apprehension of being is always partly determined by the 
factual experience of being and historical situation (Heidegger, M. 1975: §5). 
121 i.e. event, rather than a state of presence, abstracted from temporal becoming 
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contingencies of one's situation. Consequently, in Sartre's account, ongoing, historically 
contingent relations with others shape subjectivity, yet we are free. 
Section 4: Hell is other people 
In the ontology of Being & Nothingness, we find an ambiguity between the transcendent, 
universal, condition of being-for-itself on the one hand, and being-for-others on the other, 
the latter aspect of subjectivity exposed to the contingencies of social existence. Being-
for-others is a mode of being an object of consciousness. One' s autonomy is undercut by 
the effect of others on reflective consciousness, resulting in an ambiguous tension 
between the two modes of being that results in a conflict of interests. Thus, "Conflict is 
the original meaning of being-for-others." 122 The synthesis of these opposing interests in 
mutual recognition, Sartre rejects on the basis of the radical alterity of being-for-itself and 
being-for-others. I pose this problem of conflict, to go on to show that there is a 
dialectical mediation of interests implicit in Sartre's ontology, which I will use to explain 
how the notion of freedom is entailed by his account of co-constitutive relations of 
power. 
The chapter of Being & Nothingness, 'On Concrete Relations with Others, outlines two 
distinct modes of subjectivity, resulting in conflict, that are possible if either participant 
desires to overcome the fundamental ambiguity between being-for-itself and being-for-
others that social relations entail. Sartre illustrates the conflict between these two modes 
of being as a relation between sadism and masochism. We shall see how both attempts to 
overcome the ambiguity of being-for-itself and being-for-others entailed by social 
relations, through synthesis, are doomed to frustration, and lead to conflict. My broader 
task is to show how relations of power mediate freedom, so that I may defend Foucault's 
line on the political and historical mediation of subjective freedom. 
The mode of concrete relations with others that is sadism, or mastery, involves fleeing 
from the objectifying gaze of the other. This is the flight to transcendence, which denies 
122 Sartre, JP. B&N, 1956: Chapter 3, § 1: 364. 
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our facticity. Like the voyeur looking through the keyhole, the sadist loses awareness of 
his being-in-itself, being-for-others, through intentional enthralment with the object of his 
attention. Relations with others entail an ambiguity between being-in-itself and being-for-
itself, which the sadist hides from himself in bad faith, treating the other as a mere object 
of his attention, to hide the object of attention that he is for the other as subjectl23 . Fleeing 
his facticity, he tries to sustain the illusion of transcendent ontological freedom in the 
face of existential, historical inter-subjectivity in an attempt to overcome the dependence 
of his freedom on the regard of the other124 The masochist, by contrast, tries to be a mere 
object of the sadist's attention, and not a subject that looks back with regard, undermining 
the sadist's pure transcendence 125. Thus she flees her transcendence. 
The sadist and the masochist can pursue domination or submission respectively, only by 
blinding themselves to its futility - he cannot be pure transcendence, and she cannot be 
pure facticity. To flee the ambiguity of co-constitutive transcendence and facticity is an 
unstable project, requiring ongoing maintenance, the wilful imaginary suspension of the 
historical becoming of human being. The masochist, for example, cannot choose to be 
pure facticity, thus it is in bad faith to seek to do so126. Bad faith is the attempt to escape 
the ambiguity of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, or, being-for-others, which is a mode 
of the in-itself. The desire for completeness in oneself necessarily meets with frustration, 
since one is affected by the regard of others127 The pursuit of self-present identity, which 
I explain in the following section in terms of the "God Project," undermines itself, 
whether this is through mastery or submission. One cannot reconcile the ambiguity of 
one's identity, between being-for-oneself and being-for-others, by denying either term. 
The attempt to escape this ambiguity is proved to be impossible in ongoing social 
relations due to the problem of recognition: one's self, as a presence in the world, is 
affected by the regard of others. 
123 Sartre, JP. B&N. 1956: Chapter 3, §2: 38l. 
124 Martin, T, 2002: 102. 
125 Sartre, JP. B&N. 1956: Chapter 3, §I: 368. 
126 Ibid: 369. 
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Section 5: On the (im)possihility of historical closure (The God-Project) 
Sartre describes as the God-project, the desire to be for-oneself-in-oneself, the foundation 
of one's being. It involves a desire to hang onto transcendence or facticity in social 
relations, despite the effect of the other on reflective consciousness. The God-project is 
the desire to be the foundation of one's own being, being-in-itself-for-itself. The 
underlying impossibility of this desire dooms relations involving such a desire to bad 
faith. Both sadism and masochism entail bad faith in so far as each aspires to overcome 
the fundamental ambiguity between being-for-itself and being-for-others. This inevitably 
involves denying one's transcendence, or one 's facticity, and/or denying the 
transcendence or facticity of the other. 
It is the antagonism entailed by this effort which, in Sartre's account, dooms most social 
relations to failure, excessively insistent on the autonomy and interiority of the 
transcendent subject, and thereby refusing mediation between self and other, being-for-
itself and being-in-itself. "Conflict," as Sartre put it, "is the original meaning of my 
being-for-others.,,128 The attempt to overcome ambiguity of identity in social relations 
brings one to an impasse. 
The sadist's desire to be pure transcendence is undermined by his dependence on the 
recognition of this transcendence by that which he wishes to treat as being-in-itself. 
Likewise the masochist's flight from transcendence is undermined by her dependence on 
the recognition of the sadist. The masochist must consciously attract the gaze of the 
sadist, which undercuts her facticity. In both cases the instability of the desire for self-
present identity - being-for-itself-in-itself - the God-project - proves impossible. The 
attempt to deny the dependence of identity on its relation with alterity results in the 
antagonism of conflicts of interest - relations of power - that meet an impasse, as follows: 
conflict cannot be overcome in a mediation of interests, if either party attempts to flee the 
127 Butler, J. 1987: 152. 
128 Sartre, JP. B&N, 1956: 363. 
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ambiguity this entails for their identity. Transcendent freedom, which we have analysed 
in response to Zizek and Taylor's objection to Foucault, is shown by Sartre's account to 
lead to an antagonistic impasse if - contrary to Foucault - one denies the mediation of 
subjectivity with the ongoing, historical contingencies of social interaction. 
Is there a way around the impasse generated by the God-project? In Sartre's account, 
there seems to be an absence of mediation between individuals, an apparent denial of the 
possibility of achieving harmonious social relations, and the resolution of conflict. 
Resolution is impossible in Sartre's account given the alterity between being-for-itself 
and being-for-others. Social existence entails an ambiguity between the two, and there is 
no possibility of overcoming their difference. Nevertheless it remains to be seen whether 
there may not be a middle ground - a Third Way - between conflict and harmony, 
impasse and the impossible goal of overcoming conflicts of interest once and for all. It is 
with appeal to a particular temporal notion of dialectical becoming that I wish to address 
this problem of finding a way around conflicts of interest in the face of primary 
ontological alterity. 
In the following two sections I suggest a way around the impasse discussed, with an 
Hegelian reading of the confrontation between self and other in social relations, without 
implying resolution. Dialectical analysis reveals, by way of a critique of logical identity, 
that what may be seen as an irresolvable impasse in the context of relations amongst 
autonomous subjects can be 'resolved' only in terms of an ongoing effort towards the 
self-consciously ideal goal of overcoming the ambiguity of beings-for-self being-for-
others. Social relations ought therefore to take the form of good faith. This would amount 
to what Verstraeten calls the Genuine Infinite - the self-conscious acknowledgement of 
the impossibility of being-for-itself-in-itself whilst engaging in the perpetual renewal of 
the desire to overcome the ambiguity entailed by being-for-itself and being-for-others129 -
i.e. recognising, and being recognised by the other, without objectifying either her, or 
129 The similarities between this idea and Nietzsche's notion of the Eternal Return are worth pursuing with 
reference to authenticity. 
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oneself, in response 130. A dialectical analysis of the apparent impasse between being-for-
self and being-for-others demonstrates how this is possible in Sartre's account. 
Section 6: Dialectical Technicalities 
This section will introduce the dialectical methodology I will use to explain why concrete 
ongoing historical relations with others do not undermine transcendent ontological 
freedom. In accordance with his denial of the overcoming of ontological alterity between 
self and other, Sartre denies that his analysis of social relations is in any way dialectical. 
In Being & Nothingness, he argues specifically against a dialectical interpretation of 
social relations, rejecting Hegel's philosophy as succumbing to an epistemological and 
ontological ' optimism,131 Sartre 's main objection to Hegel 's account of self-
consciousness is that it is constitutive of the self. For Sartre, social relations are 
exclusively a posteriori, whereas for Hegel the relation with the other is constitutive of 
the self.132 Sartre argues that Hegel has neglected to account for the ontological rift 
between self and other, having rejected an account of self-consciousness that admits of 
intrinsic relational structures between self and other. This refusal to let go of a conception 
of freedom, transcending, and prior to, social relations, coupled with Sartre' s reading of 
Hegelian synthesis as overcoming difference in the whole, leads him to deny a dialectical 
interpretation of his account of concrete relations with others, since he believes this 
undermines transcendent freedom. 
By contrast with Sartre, my reading of Hegelian dialectics rejects the interpretation of 
synthesis as overcoming. It is such an interpretation of synthesis which I wish to 
challenge in this section, in order to clear the way for a dialectical interpretation of 
concrete relations with others, which reveals a way past the impasse Sartre describes 
without denying ontological aiterity responsible therefore. In doing so, I furthermore 
critique what Derrida calls a "metaphysics of presence" . The 'presence' of something is 
130 The genuine infmite could perfonn the task of providing an impossible ideal, whose very impossibility 
infonns the ever-renewing activity of ethical deliberation. This is similar to the DerrideanlLevinasian ideal 
of justice as the impossible ideal to which law aspires. 
131 Sartre, JP: E&N: 185. 
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its essential identity outside of the contingent changes affecting it through time, i.e. its 
form or essence. Hegelian dialectics rejects ontological assumptions of presence, such as 
the classic liberal presumption of the pre-constituted individual entering into relations 
with other such subjects in social contract theory, for example. Hegel's dialectical 
rejection of logical identity draws out the mistake of presuming self-presence in the face 
of ambiguous, historically contingent relational ambiguity. 
The critique of logical identity, combined with an interpretation of the dialectic which 
overcomes Sartre's objections to Hegelian synthesis, makes sense of the possibility of 
'resolving' the irreducible tension between being-for-self and being-for-others without 
undermining their abstracted ontological alterity from one another. There are thus two 
elements to watch out for in this section: firstly, the critique of the logic of identity and 
metaphysics of presence and, secondly, the distinct interpretation of synthesis as an 
ongoing process which resists the stable resolution of contradictory terms. The following 
section will use these theoretical tools of analysis to resolve the problem of the impasse 
in concrete social relations discussed in relation to Sartre. 
I present this technical account of Hegel ' s dialectical method to avoid potential 
misunderstandings with regard to its practical application in Sartre's social ontology, 
particularly in light of Sartre's rejection of dialectical synthesis. The principle of 
dialectics explains relations between contradictions as a relation between thesis and anti-
thesis, in synthesis. This dialectical principle has been interpreted with various meanings 
- sometimes irreconcilably. The root of dialectics is the idea of a relation between a thing 
and its contradiction. Opinion divides over the nature of that relation. Let us begin, then, 
with the classic Aristotelean principle of logic - the foundation of philosophical 
argument, one might say: the law of non-contradiction. 
According to Aristotle, a thing cannot simultaneously be both itself and not itself. For 'I' 
to be 'I', it cannot be not-'I' . Identity entails non-contradiction, appealing to a Platonic 
conception of being as presence. It entails an understanding of language, which posits a 
132 See Verstraeten, P. "Hegel and Sartre" in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, 1992: 368-369. 
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direct relation between signifier and signified. When I say "horse", the word refers to 
nothing but a horse. The relations between "horse" and all that is not horse (zebra-ness 
for example) are unnecessary elements of the meaning of "horse". This principle of non-
contradiction is the basis of philosophical argument, such as modus ponens and modus 
toliens. If one premise contradicts another, then an argument is either sustained, or falls 
flat. All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore Socrates is mortal. We find a 
stable, reliable foundation for logical argument in the related principles of non-
contradiction and identity, notably in matters of personal identity. 
This principle, which Platonic metaphysics entails, has, however, come under much 
recent criticism, for example in Derrida's concept of differance whereby the identity of a 
term is acquired through its relation with what it is not. A similar point is clearly evident 
in Trotsky' s introductory The ABC of Materialist Dialectics, which makes the following 
criticism of the principle of identity. "The axiom 'A is equal to A' signifies that a thing is 
equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist!,,133 By this statement he 
identifies a flaw with analytic logic, which is no doubt the basis of the "Tl, T2" 
annotations found in much analytic philosophy which appear to acknowledge the 
obligation to point out the abstraction of each present moment described, from its 
historical, temporal flux. Trotsky argues that existence entails uninterrupted 
transformation through time. Through erosion, for example, a basic rock changes shape. 
The elements, amongst which a thing must exist, change it. Things exist only in relation, 
through time, and therefore change constantly. Identifying a thing in its static moment of 
being, is therefore, necessarily, an abstraction from existence. Dialectics self-consciously 
incorporates the historical, temporal motion of becoming into the a-temporal abstraction 
from existence conducted by theory. 
Contrary to the intuition that the opposite of that which is true must be false, Hegel 
criticized "ordinary thinking" for not seeing the positive side of contradiction. He saw in 
the law of identity ('P = 'P) an empty tautology, bereft of content, leading nowhere. In an 
early piece of writing, prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit, he gave two arguments 
Il3 Trotsky, L. The ABC of Materialist Dialectics, 1939: 2. 
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against the principle of identity: I) Just as the law of identity distinguishes identity from 
difference, so identity is different from difference. This means that to be different is part 
of the very nature of identity, as Derrida's critique of metaphysics of presence maintains. 
2) If the answer to a question like 'What is a plant? ' were simply, 'A plant,' then the 
purity of the principle of identity can be preserved, but no new knowledge gained. Our 
questions ask for more than simple, abstract identity, and thus the principle of non-
contradiction is oflimited usefulness l34. 
According to Hegel, '1' has not- '1', its contradiction, in its very nature; contradiction is 
internal to every category. Furthermore, ideas, which appear in contradiction, are 
conceptually mediated by tendencies within them: "It is the prerogative of the 
philosopher to see that everything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives 
its value by its connection with the whole.,,135 Identity is only rendered actual to the 
extent that the identity of a thing is mediated through that from which it is different. The 
Hegelian subject, for example, "is not a self-identical subject who travels smugly from 
one ontological place to another, it is its travels.,,136 That is to say, the subject is never 
self-identical. It is - it becomes - only to the extent that it is enacted in the world. 
Existence entails becoming. 
We saw a similar notion in the concept of intentionality in the previous chapter. What the 
object reveals and what consciousness contributes are indistinguishable, which 
undermines the subject-object divide. Hegel demonstrated this in the following critique of 
Cartesian dualism, which he sees to be a result of the dualism distinguishing the subject 
from the external world of objects. 
Neither the Subjective, by itself, nor the Objective, by itself, fills up consciousness. The pure 
Subjective is as much abstraction as the pure Objective ... It is in view of the identity of the 
Subject and Object that [posit things outside of me with as much certainty as [posit myself: 
things exist just as certainly as [myself exist. 137 
134 Hegel, GWF in Wilde, L. Logic: Dialectic and Contradiction. 1992: 277. 
135 Hegel, GWF. "Preface" to Phenomenology a/Spirit, 1977: 9. 
136 Butler, J. 1987: 8. 
137 Hegel, GWF in Kojeve, A. 1969: 151. 
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What we see in Hegel's dialectical method is an attempt to make lucid the ambiguities of 
antagonistic, yet co-constitutive relationships, with the synthesis of the subject and object 
of intentionality, in perception. Entailed by synthesis is the idea that nothing is ever self-
present. A thing's identity is always bound up in its relations with that which it is not. To 
put it mildly, however, there has been some confusion over the extent to which Hegel 
finds unity in antagonism. The Phenomenology of Spirit appears to set up a totalising 
system, which overcomes all difference in a synthesis of the Absolute at the end of 
history. "Absolute knowledge, which reveals the totality of Being, can be realised only at 
the end of History.,, 138 From the primary ontological contradiction between being and 
nothingness, synthesised in becoming, each dialectic feeds into the next through 
consciousness, self-consciousness and historical social structures towards a final end 
alleged to resolve all contradiction. I will argue, however, that the uninterrupted 
movement of time implicit in ongoing historical realisation undermines the idea that there 
can be a final realisation ofthe end l39 of History. 
The ' realisation' of the end of history is in fact illustrated as impossible in the following , 
illuminating, etymological analysis of the very word ' realisation', thereby making space 
for a re-interpretation of the meaning of the 'end of history' in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. The two parts of the word - 'real', and ' -ation' (entailing manufacture) implies a 
dialectical reading of the word in terms of becoming, as opposed to being. Realisation is 
the making-real, yet reality is the given, the fact, which undermines the construction 
implied by 'realisation'. 'Realisation' carries the sense of grasping a reality that is already 
there, yet it carries the further sense of also creating that reality. This illustrates the nature 
of intentional subject-object relations in perception: our projection into the world, of the 
world. We realise, but on closer inspection, must understand the constructed-ness of our 
realisation, implying a certain un-reality if taken purely from the point of view of the 
object. This undermines our realisation, showing how the grasping of reality is co-
constituted by its opposite - fiction. The documentary tells a story. Realisation is 
Il8 Kojeve, A. 1969: 32. 
139 In the sense of 'means and ends' 
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simultaneously a bringing of reality to oneself and oneselfto reality, in manufacture. It is, 
strictly speaking, impossible - a contradiction. 
Hegel's critique of Cartesian subject-object dualism discussed earlier illustrates the co-
constitutive effect which such contradictory terms have on each other through activity, 
that is, as events unfold through historical progression. In his descriptions of synthesis, 
Hegel always sustains the tension between thesis and anti-thesis, as we see in § 161 of PS: 
The positive and negative stimulate each other into activity. Being is posited as not-being, 
suspended in unity. The two distinguished moments both subsist; they are implicit and are 
opposite in themselves, that is, each is the opposite of itself; each has its 'other' within it and they 
are only one unity. 
This unity, as we see, is not a static unity, but movement, uninterrupted, ongoing. The 
antagonism is thus the dialectical relation. The relation is its unity. Hence, synthesis is 
not an overcoming but the bond that ties thesis to anti-thesis in a never-completed 
becoming. Hegel's PS suggests the impossibility of closure within experience, within 
time. 
As Judith Butler explains, "We begin with the determinate, the particular, and the 
immediate [i.e. the thesis], and treat it as if it were absolute, and then learn through that 
misplaced certainty that the Absolute is broader, more internally complicated than we 
thought.,,140 This is the movement entailed by dialectical negation. It is movement 
towards an ever-receding end-point, but is nonetheless movement - a cyclical surpassing 
of itself. The mutual antagonism between thesis and anti-thesis must not be understood-
under the interpretation of dialectics as overcoming I have argued against - as therefore 
entailing stasis. Synthesis is progress, through antagonism, towards an end-point, which 
must be surpassed. The end, or goal, of history is continually surpassed, through 
historical becoming. No term can remain static if it is to have meaning, direction. As 
Lenin wrote in the ironically titled, in light of the following insight, The End of Classical 
German Philosophy: "For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It 
140 Butler, J. 1987: 23 . 
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reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure 
before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away.,,141 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit we witness this process of becoming in the frustrated 
attempts of self-consciousness to realize itself through its relations with alterity. The 
subject continually mistakes stasis for truth, attempting to impose presence on the flux of 
becoming, "purporting to present exhaustively the full reality of the object at hand," 142 
only to be undone by ensuing contradictions. Synthesis betrays the possibility of static, 
self-present instantiation. Self-consciousness can only present itself within a relation of 
antitheses, lending it an illusion of presence, which must be undone. The ongoing 
becoming of synthesis entails the continual constitution and undoing of subjectivity 
through relations with other subjects. The antagonism is irresolvable, yet - contra Sartre -
this need not prevent us from aiming towards the resolution of conflicts of interest. 
Recognising the ambiguous co-constitutive dynamics of conflicting social relations, 
coupled with acknowledgement of the impossibility of overcoming the difference 
entailed by individual transcendence, might allow each party to work towards 
overcoming the impasse of a conflict of interests, without expecting their respective 
individual interests to be fully satisfied, recognising that individual freedom is mediated 
through relations with others. This section has laid out an important tool for the task of 
such a re-interpretation of Sartre ' s account: a critique of logical identity within a non-
teleological dialectical framework, which I shall use once again in chapter three. 
Synthesis reveals the co-constitutive nature of contradictory terms through temporal 
processes such that even the ideal of harmony towards which social relations should be 
directed, is shaped by discord throughout the ongoing process of history. In time, the 
ideal is made manifest as ambiguity. 
141 Engels, F: §2. 
142 Butler, 1. 1987: 27. 
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Section 7: Overcoming Conflict & Ambiguity: An End Without End 
In this section I interpret Sartre's account of concrete social relations according to the 
dialectical methodology developed in the previous section to show how the impasse 
between self and other addressed in section three might be unblocked. Despite Sartre's 
rejection of dialectics I believe that, given the interpretation of synthesis for which I 
argue, it both accords with and helps to make sense of his account of social relations in 
Being & Nothingness. Such an understanding overcomes the difficulties Sartre runs into 
trying to account for transcendent freedom in the context of inter-subjectivity. I use the 
notion of synthesis developed in the previous section to hold onto the transcendence of 
the terms of opposition in Sartre's account of social relations without necessitating an 
impasse. If dialectical synthesis is restricted to the form of becoming, rather than 
overcoming, we see that its relation with alterity undermines the radical interiority of 
consciousness. Yet subjectivity is not reducible to this relation. Social relations and 
personal freedom are at odds, yet this need not result in an impasse. 
We saw in the analysis of intentionality in the previous chapter that subjectivity, for 
Sartre, is necessarily imbricated in the object-world. The subject has both transcendence 
and facticity. Intentionality was explained in terms of dialectical synthesis. In this section 
I reveal a dialectical relationship at work between being-for-itself and being-for-others 
with reference to Hegel 's understanding of the struggle for recognition, involving an 
acknowledgement of the God-project's ideality in the face of ongoing relations of power. 
Dialectical analysis of the God-project demonstrates that the human subject is 
simultaneously independent of and essentially interrelated with others, with a similarly 
ambiguous ontology. It shows that self-consciousness is impossible to achieve without 
relations with others. This contact, however, is also the basis of conflicts of interests 
fundamental to human existence. 
Let us begin with a dialectical analysis of Sartre's account of concrete social relations 
described in section two. To recall, the self, in the act of intentionality, is merely that 
which is not its object. There is that, and I am not that, therefore I am. Only through 
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absence does one become aware of oneself. One is thus dependent on the object of one's 
awareness in order to know oneself as independent. I am being-for-itself, but the only 
way I know this is through the being-in-itself of which I am aware. This dependence 
undermines the independence that constitutes me. The subject is subjectively certain of 
herself, aware of herself as onto logically distinct from that which she contemplates. But 
this subjective certainty is incomplete. The subject must find the private idea she has of 
herself in external objective realityl43 in order that her sUbjective self-awareness attains 
the same level of objectivity as objects in reality, transcending the whims of her 
imagination. 
On Hegel's interpretation, since I cannot gain recognition of my transcendence through 
relations with objects, to attain objective knowledge of being-for-self I must desire 
another desire. Such is the desire for recognition: the desire oJbeing-for-selfto be known 
by being-for-self as being-for-self. 
To desire non-Being is to liberate oneself from Being, to realize one's autonomy, one's Freedom. 
To be anthropogenetic, then, Desire must be directed towards a non-Being - that is, towards 
another Desire, another greedy emptiness, another I. For Desire is the absence of Being ... and not 
a Being that is. 144 
Being-for-self can only find objective verification of its being-for-self by being-for-
others. As Hegel argued, "a self-consciousness exists only Jar [emphasis added] a self-
consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-conscious; only in this way does the unity of itself 
in its otherness become explicit for it.,,145 In the other, the subject hopes to find the 
independent embodiment of the negation that she is, the reflection of her-self. The subject 
desires to know herself as desire, and thus recognize her independence. This is necessary 
for the attainment of self-consciousness. "The human reality can only be sociaL .. Man 
can appear on earth only within a herd. ,,146 With the critique of identity entailed by 
dialectical intentionality, the desire for self-present awareness of one's independence is 
undermined by inter-dependence. One cannot be the ground of one's own recognition. 
143 Kojeve, A. 1969: 11. 
144 Kojeve, A. 1969: 40. 
145 Hegel, GWF. Phenomenology olSpirit: § 177. 
146 Kojeve, A. 1969: 6. 
57 
This has important implication for the God-project, which Sartre describes as leading to 
an impasse, involving necessary conflicts of interest in social relations. 
Dialectical analysis illustrates the problem of Sartre's impasse. On the one hand one finds 
oneself through one's relations with others: the other is the condition of objective self-
certainty. However, this means one also loses oneself in an-other: I am dependent on the 
recognition of the other for proof of my being-for-self. I only find evidence of my 
independence, in dependence. Given the God-project, the attempt to be-in-itself-for-itself, 
this explains the necessary conflicts of interest entailed in social relations. The initial 
encounter with the other is a "narcissistic project, which fails through the inability to 
recognise the other's freedom.,,147 The subject expects a passive medium of reflection for 
itself not realising the other wants the same thing. She wants to overcome her 
dependence, to be recognised as being-for-itself, but for that recognition to satisfy her, 
she has to know that the other is also a subject, who wants to be recognised as being-for-
itself. Thus the desire for recognition leads to an impasse with both individuals in a 
relation seeking to reclaim their autonomy. 
Dialectical analysis demonstrates that we are never alone and run into conflict with each 
other when we attempt to overcome the inter-dependence of our identities on the 
recognition of others, or when recognition is not mediated with reciprocation. Being-for-
self inevitably involves relations with others, which affect the very constitution of one's 
identity. In contrast to much of Western political philosophy, which assumes that 
freedom is constituted in the individual, prior to the conflict entailed by social relations, 
this anticipates the necessary frustration of the attempt to overcome the dependence of 
one's identity on the recognition of others l48, and the violence that is necessary in the 
attempt to impose it. It explains basic conflicts of interest within an inter-subjective, 
temporal, framework wherein one's ongoing relations with others complicate self-present 
147 Butler, J. 1989: 146. 
148 I.e. the 'God-project' 
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'interest,149 The "self' of self-consciousness can be no more than an abstraction from the 
ongoing historical becoming of being. As we shall see later in our discussion of 
Foucault's conception ofrelations of power, this has crucial bearing on the "self' of self-
interest. 
Rife with contradictions, the God-project cannot be sustained. Self-interest generates 
inter-subjectivity, but only though conflict. The ideal state of nature, in which we are 
beholden to no one but ourselves, is an unsustainable abstraction from the historical 
unfolding of social existence. "The being that acts to satisfy his own instincts, which - as 
such - are always natural, does not rise above Nature," writes Kojeve lSO Social existence 
removes us from an 'ideal' state of nature, to a situation in which our freedom can be 
realised only through relations with others. This points to the problem with an a-
historical, universal account of a state of nature in political theory. Abstracted from its 
historical situation, our freedom is meaningless. Individual freedom is constituted in 
ongoing relations with others. We are permanently tied up in human history; our 
independence dialectically bound to dependence. 
Dialectical analysis resolves the impasse between being-for-self and being-for-others 
entailed by the God-project. Contrary to Sartre ' s objection to dialectics, the God-project 
can be interpreted in terms of dialectical synthesis as a temporal device. This mechanism 
mirrors the temporality entailed by dialectical synthesis. The ongoing attempt to 
overcome the ambiguity between being-for-itself and being-for-others gives sens, lSI or 
direction, and thus meaning, to the mutual antagonism of the co-constitutional 
relationship between the antithetical terms of self and other. Thus the god-project informs 
the movement, the temporalisation of the modes of interaction in Sartre's account of 
concrete relations with others. It moves conflict forward, freeing the antithetical terms of 
being-for-self and being-for-others from static antagonistic presence, thereby making 
space for their historical becoming in relation to one another. The terms of self and other, 
149 An everyday example would be that my interest in acquiring an expensive car is not un-related to the 
status accorded to it by others. Thus my interests are socially mediated in historically contingent relations 
of power, not self-constituted, prior to such relations. 
I" Kojeve, A. 1969: 42. 
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abstracted from each other in their ambiguous relations with each other, make sense 
(sens) through their effect on one another as time unfolds. Activity affects the beings who 
enact it. Remember that Sartre, an existentialist, states explicitly that freedom exists in 
situation, which is historical, temporal: existence precedes essence; being is becoming. 
The desire to be God is the desire of the for-itself to be the foundation of its own being, 
but the in-itself is the guarantee of the for-itselfs failure l52 since it transcends 
consciousness. Such frustration is, in turn, the ground of the ongoing renewal of desire, 
impelled forward by the impossible goal of satisfaction. As with the sens of Hegel's end 
of history, this imaginary ideal is the motor of development, giving direction to the 
antagonistic relation between self and other by way of temporality, but never allowing 
resolution. This accords with Heidegger's belief that the original constitution of Dasein is 
temporality. "Time is the horizon from which something like being becomes at all 
possible.,,153 Both Hegel's conceptions of synthesis, directed towards an unrealisable end, 
and the desire for self-present consciousness, reflect the sens of the desire to be God. 
Verstraeten demonstrates that in Being & Nothingness "the effect of desire is to motivate 
behaviour by the revelation of its lack with respect to the in-itself-for-itself,154. Hegel 
reveals this lack through his conception of the co-constitution of the finite and infinite. 
Just as the positing of a limit entails the possibility of overstepping the limit, so the desire 
for self-identity cannot overcome the contingency of existence, the compulsion to keep 
choosing. Sartre misinterprets Hegel's 'end of history' as a destination rather than a 
direction, a denial of this necessary' overstepping of the limit' . 
Yet, contrary to Sartre ' s anti-teleological rejection of synthesis, "there is an ultimate 
resurgence of the dialectic ... at the level of absolute knowledge in Hegel: the necessary 
overstepping of limits.,,155 Sartre unwittingly accords with Hegel that "it is in vain to 
lSI The sense of 'sens' being both direction and meaning (i.e. sense) 
152 Butler, 1. 1987: 95. 
153 Heidegger, M. "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology", 19xx: §4. 
154 Verstraeten: 363. 
155 Verstraeten: 365. 
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attempt to essentialise into eternity the finite obtaining of the object of desire."I56 The 
unceasing renewal of the desire to overcome alterity through the impossible task itself is 
the meaning of the becoming of self-consciousness. This is the sens of the God-project 
and Hegel's end of history. 
Flynn argues similarly to Verstraeten, emphasizing the existential side of Sartre's 
phenomenological existentialism: "Existential ontology is itself historical.. . the 
appearance of the for-itself is, properly speaking, the irruption of history into the 
world.,,157 There is no being, or presence, in being-for-itself beyond historical becoming 
wherein the transcendence of the for-itself is compromised by being-for-others , 
regardless of the abstract ontological distinction made by Sartre. Sartre argued that since 
no end-terminus of history is possible, one cannot take a measure of history from outside 
(as he believes Hegel attempts) looking back from the point of view of the end of history. 
If history does not end, the dialectic cannot confirm itself because, if there is no whole, 
there is no dialectic. 158 However if we posit the 'end of history' as an unattainable goal 
giving sens to being as historical becoming in terms of 'direction toward" , there appears 
to be no deep disagreement between Sartre and Hegel. 
The dialectical interpretation of the God-project I have given helps reconcile Sartre's 
notion of transcendent freedom with an inter-subjective ontology, without succumbing to 
the pitfall which Sartre wished to avoid: that of overcoming difference through co-
constitutive relation l59 - the impossible realisation of the in-itself-for-itselfI6o. In addition, 
we thus overcome a certain 'poverty' in Being & Nothingness that is frequently alluded to 
by commentators l61 . This involves the criticism that that there is an absence of mediation 
between self and other in Sartre's looking/looked-at model of social relations, which 
156 Sartre, JP in Verstraeten: 367. 
157 Sartre, JP, in Flynn, T. 1977: 45. 
158 Sartre, JP, in Flynn, T. 1977: 46. 
159 V erstraeten: 369. 
16<1 This is because the 'being' of 'being-in-itself and 'being-for-itself are revealed always already to be 
involved in historical becoming, whereby their presence is complicated by the temporal activity of negation 
16 1 See Martin, T, 2000: 109-110; Flynn, T. 1977: 60; Verstraeten: 369-370; Butler, J. 1987: 157; Merleau-
Panty, De Beauvoir, and later Sartre himself in the Critique of Dialectical Reason tried to overcome these 
problems 
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gives rise to difficulties in accounting for the kind of collective sUbjectivity experienced 
by the groupl62. The mediation, I believe, that Sartre needs is to be found in a dialectical 
interpretation of social relations he expressly avoided. 
We are now able to resolve the impasse from the end of section three: The sadist's desire 
to be pure transcendence is undermined by her dependence on the recognition of this 
transcendence by that which she wishes to treat as being-in-itself. Likewise the 
masochist's flight from transcendence is undermined by her dependence on the 
recognition of the sadist, which she must seek. The masochist must consciously attract 
the gaze of the sadist, which undermines her denial of transcendence. In both cases the 
instability of the desire for self-present identity is revealed, and the attempt to deny the 
dependence of identity on its relation with alterity results in the antagonism of relations 
of power. 
The struggle for recognition between two independent selves, ultimately - if one's 
interests could be abstracted to the level of individuality, which the dialectic proves to be 
impossible - leads to an impasse. The project of overcoming the ambiguity of identity 
involved in social relations is not achievable. But if it is recognized as an ideal bound to 
frustration, entailing recognition of the impossibility of achieving self-presenceI63, this 
ideal nonetheless allows for movement and development of social relations towards the 
impossible ideal of overcoming conflicts of interest. 
An Hegelian reading of Sartre' s analysis of concrete relations with others reveals a co-
constitutive relationship between self and other wherein each simultaneously undermines 
and reinforces the other's freedom. Self-consciousness is objectively grounded in the 
other's recognition, even as one 's subjectivity eludes the other, and vice versa. The 
movement of recognition is both mutual and impossible due to the transcendent alterity 
that motivates it. Sartre' s worry that difference is subsumed by synthesis is unfounded 
since synthesis need not entail an overcoming of difference. The dialectic in fact explains 
162 Recall the impasse described earlier in terms of the sadomasochistic tendencies in concrete relations 
with others 
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how freedom can subsist in an inter-subjective framework where social relations are 
historically ongoing. 
Section 8: Defending Resistance 
I will now use the dialectical ontology of freedom in relations with others, developed in 
response to Sartre's account of social relations, to defend Foucault's account of power 
and against Zizek and Taylor' s objections to its incoherence on the subject of freedom. 
Sartre's account of freedom meets the requirements Zizek and Taylor find lacking in 
Foucault, as I argued in section two. Yet having analysed the implications of social 
relations for the subject in Sartre's account we find individual freedom necessarily 
mediated by relations with others, which are historical and ongoing. I will thus draw on 
these findings in order to demonstrate the ontological coherence of Foucault's account of 
freedom in the face of aU-pervasive relations of power. From the ontology of subject-
object relations in chapter one, we have moved to social ontology. Being-for-itself is 
historically tied to being-in-itself, and now being-for-others. Foucault's characterisation 
of subjective freedom is not incompatible with that of Sartre, given a dialectical reading 
of the relation between self and other, despite the disagreements between the two 
philosophers. In addition, we will see how Foucault's move to the theorisation of 
productive power relations overcomes the discourse-centred structuralism of his 
Archaeological approach discussed in chapter one l64. 
In the section, to defend Foucault's definition of 'power' and 'resistance' without 
resorting to self-present terms, I will explain the meaning of each by appealing to the 
relational model of being-for-self and being-for-others, developed in the previous section. 
The immanent dialectical critique of self-presence, read through Sartre's analysis of 
social relations, shows how the subject is free to resist, even as her interests are 
constituted in relation to the other's. Thus, in addressing Zizek and Taylor's objection, it 
is important that we keep in mind the status of both acting subjects, the agent of 
163 I.e. being-in-itself-for-itself 
164 objected to by Ricouer, Laclau and Mouffe in the previous chapter 
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resistance as well as the agency against which the resisting subject acts, in Foucault's 
account of power relations. The interests of the agents, in relations of power, are co-
constitutive. 
One must thus ask not only Taylor's question, "Where is the space for a subject of 
resistance?" Since power is relational, the opposite problem is equally pertinent: "Where 
is the subject of power?" Foucault's effort to restrict his analysis of power to the event, to 
relational co-constitutive activity, seems to undermine any attempt to uncover discrete 
agency of both she who exercises power, and she on whom power is exercised. This is 
because power is never enacted uni-directionally. The exercise of power requires the 
freedom occupied by resistance. "Power and freedom are engaged in a mutual 
interplay.,,165 Each affects the other as they act on each other. Can either agent be 
abstracted from the other such that her individual freedom is maintained? The exercise of 
power requires freedom to act on the part of both agents in a power relationship. So, is 
this account ofthe 'non-subjective intentionality' 166 of power coherent? 
To begin with, since I am using dialectical analysis to explain the relations between the 
subjects of power relations, it is important to note Foucault's rejection of dialectics. His 
genealogy rejects "the meta-historical deployment of ideal signification and indefinite 
teleologies.,,167 Following Nietzsche's criticism of dialectics as involving a Socratic 
mode of thinking that tends towards Platonic conceptions of being, and presence l68, 
Foucault claims his "purposes are strictly anti-Platonic, against the supra-historical 
perspective. ,,169 The dialectic, according to Foucault, "is a way of evading the always 
open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton.,,170 "With 
relations of power, one is faced with complex phenomena which don't obey the Hegelian 
form of the dialectic.,,17l 
'" Foucault, M. "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, 1982: 221. 
166 Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and Power" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 341. 
167 Ibid. 
'68 I.e. the doctrine of fonns wherein the changeable appearance of reality is but a quality of the ideal fonn 
169 Ibid: 355. 
170 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge. 1980: 115. 
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One must bear in mind that Foucault's philosophy was always grounded on the 
interpretation of concrete empirical phenomena, institutions and social practices. He uses 
genealogy to avoid the abstractions of continuity, emphasising instead elements of 
chance, accident, error and discontinuity. "There is only the iron hand of necessity 
shaking the dice box of chance,,,172 he quotes from Nietzsche. It would indeed be 
impossible for the myriad contingencies of existence to be encapsulated neatly in the 
form of a three-pronged dialectic of negation. One ought not make any qualms about 
acknowledging the necessarily abstract nature of Hegel's dialectical formula for 
analysing concepts. It is important to consider Foucault's assertion that the dialectic is a 
logical concept too facile and simplistic to be imposed on the multifarious, chaotic 
diversity of experience. Nevertheless contingency is not inimical to theoretical analysis. 
Contrary to Foucault' s understanding of the dialectic as involving a Platonic metaphysics 
of presence I have demonstrated throughout this chapter that the dialectic reveals the 
impossibility of presence. Furthermore, the theoretical tools of abstraction, which 
dialectical analysis brings to bear on practical concerns, resist the supra-historical 
overcoming of contingency. My use of dialectical analysis is restricted to an historicist 
critique of logical identity, which demonstrates the relational ambiguity of self presence. 
This helps us to better understand the dynamic involved in relations of power when the 
event of domination is extrapolated to opposing terms. Since Foucault argues, "power 
requires an other, over whom power is exercised,,, 173 it is important to show how the 
subjects of power and resistance can be abstracted from one another. 
The question is to what extent these abstracted terms are defined in Foucault's account of 
power. Arrnstrong l74 argues cogently in an article on "Foucault and the Question of 
Autonomy" that Zizek oversimplifies Foucault's constructivist position on the formation 
of subjectivity, i.e. the extent to which subjectivity is overwhelmed by the effects of 
power. The subject's inextricable relations with others do not cancel out freedom. It is not 
171 Ibid: 56. 
In Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and Power" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reade: 352. 
173 Foucault, M. "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, 1982: 220. 
174 Armstrong, A, 2003: 7, 10. 
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a matter of either freedom or facticity, to use Sartre 's terms. Armstrong demonstrates that 
Foucault avoids a false opposition between social constructivism and autonomy, ruling 
out the traditional conception of autonomy as radical self-determination, or self-
realisation, which values agency in the causal terms of good: interior (i.e. from the self); 
bad: exterior (i.e. on the self). According to Foucault, the project of autonomy "rests upon 
notions that are not invented by the individual, but which are models he finds in his 
culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, his 
social groUp.,,175 Autonomy springs from what is normally regarded as its opposite, that 
which affects the subject from without. 
Armstrong defends Foucault from Zizek's objection that Foucault leaves no space for 
freedom to resist, by demonstrating how, in Foucault, autonomy is developed in relation 
to techniques of subjectification and disciplinary power so that we watch over ourselves, 
but that at the same time this autonomy allows us to be critical. We are in fact 
autonomous because of power relations, and as Foucault frequently argues176, this 
autonomy, is what allows for the possibility of resistance. Autonomy is not something 
attainable in isolation, as I demonstrated, when explaining in the previous section how it 
is bad faith to deny the fundamental ambiguity of being-for-self and being-for-others, 
with the notion of "freedom in situation". Dialectical analysis helps explain such co-
constitutive activity. 
The historicist critique of identity and presence has direct bearing on Armstrong's 
argument against a dualistic conception of relations between self and other, freedom and 
the effects of power. Rejecting Kant's project to identify the abstract forms of 
transcendent consciousness thereby to derive universal, foundational , criteria for 
knowledge, Hegel argued there is no objective ground from which to reveal a universal 
account of the subject, because the distinction between subject and object is a product of 
the mind177. You cannot characterize reality in terms independent of that reality. Apart 
from being free, the conditions of subjectivity are historically contingent on relations of 
175 Foucault, M in Armstrong, A, 2003: 11. 
116 Foucault, M. Foucault Live, 1989: 207. 
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power. Thus the only recourse is to engage in immanent critique; not from the first 
principles of foundational knowledge, but rather from principles adopted in existing, 
historical, systems of thought, i.e. on their own terms. Through immanent critique17S, 
Hegel engages opposing systems of thought in their own terms, testing them against each 
other in the mode of dialectical analysis, wherein contradictions are shown both to 
constitute and undermine each other's identity in the process of becoming. This allows 
for an historical and relational view of reality, rather than one based on the principle of 
identity. A-historical, dualistic abstractions are undermined from within by immanent 
dialectical critique. 
Hegel's immanent critique of logical identity, read through Sartre's account of social 
relations, shows up the problem with the sort of subjectivity demanded by Zizek and 
Taylor, not from an exterior position grounded upon foundational knowledge, but rather 
from within the very principles of identity. In the dialectic of recognition, the subject is 
shown to derive significance and being from the other, yet she nurtures the illusion that 
this signification is determined alone 179 Sartre made the very same insight with his 
argument that the being of being-for-itself is not being in any recognizable sense. "Its 
being is never given ... Since it is always separated from itself by the nothingness of 
otherness ... its being is a perpetual deferring.,,180 Being is always becoming, in time, 
which is why it is what it is not and is not what it is. 181 
Sartre problematized any easy understanding of the transcendental freedom of the 
subject, contrary to Foucault's post-structuralist criticisms of his 'humanist' account. 
Sartre explicitly makes a space for the relation between freedom and conditioning in his 
social ontology just as Foucault does in his approach to power. Howells makes the case 
succinctly in her analysis of Sartrean freedom: "As individuals we make ourselves on the 
basis of structures and circumstances that we experience as the natural texture of our 
existence, rather than envisaging them as limitations to a freedom that would be both un-
171 Smith, S, 1989: 170-174. 
17. The critique of logical identity mentioned earlier, for example 
179 Racevskis, K, 1980: 144. 
'80 Sartre, JP in Howells, C. 1992: 333. 
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situated and disembodied.,,1 82 Sartre's definition of freedom by the time of Critique of 
Dialectical Reason was "the little movement that makes of a totally conditioned social 
being a person who does not reproduce in its entirety what he received from his 
conditioning.,,183 I believe this to accord with Foucault's conception of the freedom to 
resist. 
Let us reconsider the notion of freedom to resist in light of the immanent critique of 
logical identity. If we analyse power from the Nietzschean point of view, as a relational 
eventl84, it is clear that both terms of the activity of power, in abstraction (i.e. the subject 
of power and the subject of resistance), are mutually co-constitutive. This undermines 
either side's attempts to resolve inter-dependence through domination or submission. 
Power takes shape from both sides of its inherent antagonism of interests. Power and 
freedom are related in a complicated interplay. Freedom, as Sartre explains, exists in 
situation. We are always already historically involved in social relations and thus 
transcendent freedom only manifests itself in relation to social forces. The focus of each 
individual in relations with others is a necessary abstraction from the inter-dependent 
interests, which in addition to their differences constitute their relationship with one 
another. Thus, ongoing, conflicting, yet inter-dependent interests constitute power, and 
freedom is constituted in relation to power. 
One might collapse the terms of opposition defining each subject in a relationship, if each 
subject is mutually involved with the other in the co-constitutive activity entailed by 
relations of power, and focus instead on the relation itself. This need not override the 
differences amongst the individuals, which constitute such a relation. Sartre was ahead of 
Foucault in bringing together metaphysical contingency and ontological freedoml85 
insisting on freedom-in-situation with the phrase, "existence precedes essence." We 
181 Sartre, JP. B&N, 1956: 137. 
lB' Howells, C. 1992: 339. 
lB3 Sartre, JP in Howells, C. 1992: 340. 
1" Foucault is adamant that "Power exists only in action ... as a mechanism" (Power/Knowledge, 1980: 89). 
He also argues that power does not exist as such, but is the activity of an action upon the action of others, 
aiming to guide the outcome of the action of the latter ("The Subject and Power" in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, 
1982: 220). 
lB' i.e. between the subject and object of intentional relations 
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become who we are in an ongoing relation with the changing world around us. Our 
relations with others inform both our identity and freedom, which in tum inform our 
relations with others. There is no freedom extrinsic to social relations, but this is not to 
say that freedom is thereby annulled. 
Through the immanent critique of logical identity in Hegel's dialectic of recognition, and 
Sartre's account of being-for-others and concrete relations with others, we find the desire 
for self-presence is frustrated by necessary inter-dependence with others. In terms 
expressed by Foucault, Hegel and Sartre show how this co-dependent relationship 
between self and other involves relations of power. Moreover, they demonstrate that any 
attempt to overcome the differences between self and other leads to conflict, perhaps 
even an impasse. We see however that an impasse can be 'resolved' in the ongoing 
attempt to overcome the contradictory intentions inherent in relational activity, if mutual 
inter-dependence is acknowledged, coupled with an understanding that the attempt to 
overcome conflicts of interest is a task without end. Conflicts of interest in power 
relations are revealed to involve ongoing historical struggle and instability by an 
immanent critique of identity. This is not to say that we should not work towards 
overcoming conflicts of interest, but rather that the attempt to maintain self-presence l86 in 
an attempt to do so, is doomed to frustration. 
In a co-constitutive relation of 'wills,' 187 recognising the impossibility of overcoming 
conflicts of interest whilst engaging in the attempt to do so, allows agents to avoid an 
impasse, or escalation of conflict, without denying the difference between them. The 
alterity that constitutes each individual subject leads to conflicts of interest in social 
relations, whose interplay may be understood in Foucault's terms, as relations of power. 
This is the antagonism entailed by relations of power. Yet such relations can be either 
mutually beneficial, for example in the relationship between a teacher and her student, or 
antagonisms can escalate to the detriment of the players when inter-dependence is denied 
in the impossible attempt to overcome conflicts of interest, for example in apartheid. 
18' i.e. the God-project: to overcome the ambiguity of identity entailed by being-for-itself and being-for-
others, to be the ground of one's freedom 
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Thus we need to recognise both the difference and inter-dependence of our respective 
interests in order to engage in mutually beneficial activity. 
Dialectical analysis of power reveals not only the coherence of subjective freedom in all-
pervasive power relations, but also a way of overcoming an impasse between conflicting 
interests, which constitute such relations. Dialectical treatment of relations between self 
and other explains how Foucault is theoretically able to maintain a position for both the 
subject of power and the subject of resistance in his account of power, thus overcoming 
the objection raised by Zizek and Taylor. Subjectification does not render the subject 
powerless. "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. 
By this we mean individual or collective agents who are faced with a field of possibilities 
in which several ways of behaving. .. may be realised. Where the determining factors 
saturate the whole, there is no relationship of power.,,188 The self-present autonomy Zizek 
and Taylor complain is lacking in Foucault's account of power is of the very sort that 
hinders social interaction when we try to hold onto it. By contrast, if freedom is 
recognised as inter-subjective, power need not manifest itself malevolently. 
187 a ' will ' can only be an abstraction from the co-constitutive relation of willing I" Foucault, M. in Wisnewski, J. 2000: 426. 
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CHAPTER THREE: POWER/KNOWLEDGE 
This final chapter draws on the historicist ontology developed in the previous chapters, to 
argue for the need in political philosophy to take into account the historical and political 
contingency of claims to knowledge, and show how this impacts on justification for 
political critique. I defend this against Taylor's objections to such an argument, as seen in 
his critique of Foucault's historicist conception of the relations between power and 
knowledge. This chapter has two parts. I begin with the argument that Foucault's political 
critique takes an immanent epistemological standpoint, which rejects a-historical, 
universal norms and foundations. I will defend the internal coherence of immanent 
critique against epistemic foundationalism. I then go on to show that Foucault's 
powerlknowledge dyad also entails a positive epistemology, which overcomes the 
problematic a-historicism one finds with foundational epistemology. In the first half of 
the chapter I argue that immanent critique is preferable to foundational critique in 
political philosophy. In the second half, I draw on the historicist ontology of the previous 
chapters to show that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and 
political contingency of knowledge, as does Foucault's historicist epistemology. 
PART ONE: FOUCAULT'S POLITICAL CRITIQUE 
In this part I will argue that Foucault undermines and rejects the Cartesian 
epistemological premises of foundational political philosophy, taking the preferable 
standpoint of immanent critique in his historico-political analysis. By this I mean that 
Foucault seeks to understand the standards of rationality within existing systems of 
thought, on their own terms, rather than according to universal norms. I argue that since, 
for Foucault, knowledge is fundamentally interested, he does not adopt an objective, 
universal standpoint outside of political bias189 Instead he engages with domination by 
exposing its means of legitimation - the discourse and practices used to justify 
asymmetrical power relations. Unlike epistemic foundationaiism, which engages 
'89 In the second half of this chapter I will argue that Foucault's positive epistemology essentially entails 
that knowledge is interested. 
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discourses from a pre-conceived external point of view, immanent critique takes its 
footing on the very ground of that which it seeks to critique. 
I will begin with Foucault's account of powerlknowledge, contextualized with respect to 
three broad historical epistemological frameworks: the Cartesian, the Hegelian and the 
Nietzschean. I then consider Taylor's contention that Foucault' s Nietzschean relativism 
undercuts his basis for political critique. I defend Foucault's epistemology against this 
objection by arguing that Taylor assumes a deficient account of power as sovereign-right, 
which Foucault's account of power overcomes. Lastly I argue that Foucault's political 
critique assumes an immanent epistemological standpoint to undermine normative, 
rational discourse used towards the ends of political domination. 
Section One: Foucault on PowerlKnowledge 
In Foucault's study of sexual repression and liberation in the first volume of his history of 
sexuality, The Will to Knowledge, in which he demonstrates the circular relation between 
discourse and domination by means of the example of sex. The Will 10 Knowledge 
contends that 20th Century sexual liberation is related to a myth about Victorian 
repression. Our so-called liberation is in fact a product of power190 In seeking to liberate 
the inner truth of sexuality from the confines of repression, we grant privileged 
interpretive power to experts who subject us to systems of normalization. This is 
symptomatic of power's influence over our supposedly natural bodies and inclinations. 
Liberation of our 'inner nature' is, in fact, mediated through so-called 'experts' in 
systems established in hierarchical power networks, and domination is often obscured 
through our projects for self-fulfilment. 
Liberation is the means by which disciplinary society has come to exert a normative 
influence over our bodies. Implicit in Foucault's argument is a critique of ideology. He 
demonstrates that since truth is necessarily interested, the revelation of truth is linked to 
190 Rabinow, P. in ed. Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader. 1984: xvi. 
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power, i.e. conflicts of interest '91 . Power and knowledge are linked in a circular relation, 
as follows: power brings about discourse, which, in turn, is used as a basis for power. 
'Liberation' from Victorian sexuality is itself mediated by power interests, which 
dominate individuals through techniques of subjectification. At the end of the book, 
Foucault brings home the point, "The irony of this deployment is in having us believe 
that our 'liberation' is in the balance."I92 We think we are escaping oppressive relations 
of power, yet our liberated sexual identities are themselves constructed in relations of 
power'93 
Freudian and Marxian conceptions of liberated individuality instigated particular, 
universal, humanist norms about self-actualisation and genuine intentions, against which 
repressed identity or false consciousness could be assessed, using scientific method to 
distinguish ideology from truth. However, by the mid-70 's, Foucault had come to reject 
the science/ideology distinction operating in his Archaeological work. Instead, he 
regarded the production of knowledge as necessarily bound up with historically specific 
regimes of power, thus treating science as having an ideological function. Since every 
society produces its own truths, which Foucault argued have a normalizing and 
regulatory function, the genealogist needs to show how these discourses of truth operate 
in relation to the dominant power structures in a given society. 194 
Foucault argues, "It is in discourse that power and knowledge are brought together.",95 
Knowledge and power are mutually determining and there can be no prior determining 
moment where knowledge or power stands outside of each other's effects. This rules out 
ideological critique, which finds the objective truth under the 'mystificatory realm of 
ideas' .'96 Even sex is mediated by powerlknowledge and cannot serve as a natural 
191 I demonstrated that social relations necessarily involve conflicts of interest, though we may work 
towards overcoming this conflict 
19' Foucault, History a/Sexuality Vol. I. 1978: 159. 
19' As Rabinow shows, there is a note of self-referential irony here, pointing to Foucault's criticism of his 
previous work, which he came to believe leaned too heavily on the repressive hypothesis underlying 
ideological analysis (Rabinow: XYll). In Archaeology, objective discursive rules determine practice, 
instead of a reciprocal influence, seen in Foucault's later work. 
19' McNay, L. 1994: 25. 
19' Foucault, M . in McNay, L. 1994: 27. 
19' Ibid: 28. 
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standpoint for ideological critique. There is no deep truth independent of regimes of 
power. Since justice is internal to discourse, Foucault realized it makes no sense to appeal 
to an objective account of justicel97, discovered from the position of conflict-overcome, 
by means of scientific method as Marx had, for example. Science, too, governed by 
human interest, is subject to political manipulation. Foucault takes the post-Marxist 
position that political relations in part condition truth claims. There can be no point of 
view external to power, since knowledge is necessarily interested. 
Before drawing out the Nietzschean dimension of Foucault's epistemological position, 
the following quote sums up Foucault's account of powerlknowledge and its relevance 
for ideological critique: 
It has been a tradition for humanism to assume that once someone gains power he ceases to 
know ... only those who keep their distance from power, who are in no way implicated in tyranny, 
shut up in their Cartesian .. . room, their meditations, only they can discover the truth ... [Rather] 
the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly 
induces effects of power ... Knowledge and power are implicated in one another, and there is no 
point dreaming ofa time when knowledge will cease to depend on power ... 'Liberate scientific 
research from the demands of monopoly capitalism': maybe it's a good slogan but it will never be 
more than a slogan .... It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as a general focus of 
philosophical discourse - whereas for Marx it was the production relation. Nietzsche is the 
philosopher of power, a philosopher who managed to think of power without having to confine 
himself within a political theory to do SO.I98 
The intellectual does not rid the virus of ideology, nor emancipate truth from power. I 
will now show how Nietzsche's epistemology involves a response to this problem. This 
will help me to justify Foucault's approach to power and knowledge and the attendant 
epistemological standpoint his later work takes. 
Section Two: Foucault's Nietzschean Epistemology 
In his paper, "Foucault and Epistemology,,,I99 Rorty argues that modem Western 
philosophy has historically taken three distinct epistemological standpoints, the 
Cartesian, the Hegelian and the Nietzschean. 
197 Alcoff, L. 1990: 1 
198 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980: 52-3. 
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The Cartesian viewpoint is that of the objective, rational sciences and, according to 
Rorty, the analytic tradition of 20th Century Anglo-American philosophy. According to 
this position, philosophy needs to look at the relations between statements and the objects 
ofthe hard sciences to isolate the 'nature of knowledge' .200 Rationality is regarded as an 
a-historical foundation, which prevents idealism and relativity in our knowledge. It is a 
fixed method or process ensuring that our representation of reality corresponds to the real 
world20I . By contrast, the Hegelian position treats knowledge as historically contingent. 
Unlike Descartes' account of the necessary conditions of knowledge, in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, knowledge is shaped by the historically contingent conditions 
ofthe knowing subject. Nevertheless, Hegel's faith in the progress of history, like Marx's 
faith in scientific method, may be seen to allow a position from which to derive a 
disinterested characterisation of objective reality202. For Foucault, as with Nietzsche, 
there can be no disinterested perspective from which to assess validity, justice, or social 
norms. 
For Nietzsche, both Cartesian and Hegelian epistemology are necessarily subservient to 
interest, the will, as is the case with all discourse. Nietzsche treats Hegelian teleology as a 
self-deceptive continuation of the Cartesian project to map our representations onto 
reality. Nietzsche argues there can be no rising above the present to view it in relation to 
enquiry in generaf03 . He rejects Cartesian and Hegelian striving for a-historical 
foundations with which to discern true statements, unbiased by interests. Since interests 
necessarily mediate our knowledge of the world, there is no means by which we may 
check the objective correspondence of our representations with unrnediated reality204. 
There is no representation independent of the will. As Foucault puts it, Nietzsche's 
position entails that, "we only know the world and ourselves under a description, we just 
happened on that description. Nature can't tell us how to apply it or whether it is the best 
199 Rorty, R. in ed. Smart, B. Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments: 37. 
200 Ibid: 39. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Synthesis, as I argued in my previous chapters, however, need not entail this ultimate standpoint, 
involving contradiction overcome, jf contradiction is treated as ongoing. 
203 Foucault. Power/Knowledge: 45. 
204 Ibid: 46. 
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one; it is just the one we have chanced to latch onto. Hence neither God nor reason can 
give us any metaphysical comfort205 ." 
Nietzsche's influence on Foucault can be traced to the culmination of Foucault's more 
strictly structuralist endeavours. Looking back at the archaeological edifice he had 
erected from which to assess the construction of discourse, Foucault self-critically drew 
out the implications of Nietzsche's declaration that "God is dead," for his own theory. 
Foucault's anti-humanist manifesto is summed up in the closing lines of the Archaeology 
of Knowledge, "You may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said, 
but don't imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live 
longer than he.206,, I mentioned this quote in an ontological context in the previous 
chapter. Let me explain the epistemological context of this quote, to demonstrate the 
effect Nietzsche's critique of the Cartesian subject of knowledge has on Foucault' s 
genealogical methodology. 
Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals shows that shattering the illusion of a transcendent God 
forbids in turn the ' lie' of correspondence truth. In modern, Cartesian epistemology, God 
ensures that our beliefs about the world can be true. Yet faith in God entails choice. We 
assumed that a transcendent God could ground the objectivity of belief. Just as without 
assenting to belief, one cannot believe in God, according to Descartes,207 similarly, 
Nietzsche argues, without interests, which give significance to experience in accordance 
with our chosen projects, there is no knowledge. Nietzsche emphasised, "the intellect has 
no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life,,208. Knowledge 
does not transcend human interest. Foucault argues a disinterested objective ontology of 
the subject cannot stand in for God as an a-historical foundation from which to derive 
knowledge. Neither, Foucault realized, does structuralist discourse-analysis provide 
objective universal foundations, which is why he later represents power (interest) and 
knowledge as co-constitutive. 
205 Ibid: 48. 
206 Foucault, M. The Archaeology a/Knowledge. 2003: 232. 
207 Descartes, R. "Fourth Meditation" in Meditations a/First Philosophy. 1996. 
208 Nietzsche, F . "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense". 1999: 141. 
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For Nietzsche, we possess concepts in relation alone. Everything is conceptualised 
relationally; relations are a matter of interpretation: "That things possess a constitution in 
themselves quite apart from our interpretation ... is a quite idle hypothesis: it presupposes 
that interpretation and subjectivity is not essential, that a thing freed from its relationships 
would still be a thing.,,209 Everything is necessarily conceptualised, for us. There can be 
no justification or representation independent of interpretation and interests. 
This critique of objective foundations for knowledge applies both to SCience and 
humanism. Foucault's Nietzschean epistemology does not transcend instincts, impulses, 
desires, fears, or our will to appropriate. Foucault treats knowledge as an effect of 
'hatred, compromise and betrayal'2lO. If knowledge is true, this is because "it produces 
the truth through the ... renewed falsification that establishes the distinction between the 
true and the untrue.,,211 Genealogy exposes the history of the error of objective truth, 
which it rejects as useless . 
History does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, 
where the rule of law fmally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system 
of rules, and thus proceeds from domination to domination.'l2 
Interest generates conflict and knowledge, and thus relations of power, in part, condition 
the truth. In genealogy, interest is posited prior to the knowledge it subordinates as 
instrument. 
In 1970, at his opening address, delivered on accepting the position of Professor of 
History ofIdeas at the College de France, Foucault proposed a genealogical undertaking. 
This would culminate in the latter half of the decade with an account of 
powerlknowledge, developed through his research into disciplinary practices and the 
construction of sexuality. Genealogy involves the premise that there are no facts , only 
interpretations. All truth is from the perspective of the will, although this will is 
relationally, not individually, constituted. Appeals to reason and truthfulness are among 
the many means by which power is asserted. Since truth is necessarily interested, there 
209 Nietzsche, F. Will to Power. 1968: pp 302-3. 
210 Foucault, M. in ed. Rabinow, P. Ethics, Subjectivity andTruth. 1990: 14. 
211 Ibid. 
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can be no universal perspective, and thus one cannot engage in critique from a universal 
point of view. 
As Said argues, Nietzschean genealogy offered Foucault a method of undermining claims 
to universality, to expose the motives of such claims, thus re-orienting notions whose use 
has become habit-ridden and debarring of evaluation. Ideas are progressively 
reinterpreted through historical struggle and did not necessarily serve the purposes they 
do today. Various interests give shape to ideas, which thus contain a layer of meanings. 
Each is inherited from, and in tum, subverts, the former. Thus, knowledge claims 
represent struggles between the wills that impose particular meanings on them213. 
Genealogy treats rules as empty in themselves, un-finalised and impersonal, to be bent to 
any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who seize rules, disguise them and 
pervert them, to invert their meaning and redirect them against those who had initially 
imposed them214. Genealogy thus sets about exposing the struggles by which norms come 
about, to break them free of inertia and passivity2l5. The development of humanity is a 
series of interpretations, and genealogy records its history216 
Foucault adapted the themes of Marxism and Critical Theory to seek connections 
between reason and power. The Holocaust and the 1968 Paris riots had undermined any 
pretension of progress in the march of reason through the centuries. Reason had proved 
not necessarily to be the "handmaiden of freedom,,217 and there was need for a new 
Critical Theory. Foucault began to look at the reciprocal interplay between reason and 
action, discourse and practice, truth and power to see how reason is implicated in 
domination. Since discourse and practice assume an interrelationship, there can be no 
discrete ontology of either, and thus no point of view from which to establish the 
underlying truth of social practices and discourse2l8. Foucault thus avoids any stable 
212 Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and Power" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucoult Reoder: 349. 
213 Nietzsche, F. The Gay Science. 2001: §344. 
214 Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and Power" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 349. 
215 Said, E. "Foucault as an Intellectual Imagination" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 39. 
216 Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and Power" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 350. 
217 Poster, M. Foucault, Marxism and History. 1984: 16. 
218 Ibid: 12 . 
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foundation, such as Marxist economic functionalism, from which to stage his 
genealogical critique of domination through discourse. 
Unlike Cartesian and Hegelian epistemology, Foucault treats knowledge as biased. His 
genealogies take three basic precautionary epistemic principles regarding the 
fundamental interrelations between power and knowledge: Firstly, he does not reject 
rationality but is aware that rationality is subject to hegemonic constraint. Rationality is 
not necessarily the handmaiden of freedom. Secondly, Foucault does not reject truth, but 
truth must be understood as historically contextualized, through relations of power. 
Lastly, the conditions of knowledge are not necessary, but are historically and politically 
contingent. In the following section I will consider a critique of Foucault, from a 
Cartesian epistemological perspective, to later explain how Foucault overcomes the 
problems I will go on to identify with Cartesian epistemology. 
Section Three: Taylor's Critique of PowerlKnowledge 
Taylor and related critics of Foucault such as Habermas, Fraser and Putnam cannot 
imagine truth except as free from politics219 The rational principles governing truth 
claims stand apart from political debate as the means by which interests are contested. 
Taylor basically argues that Foucault's account of truth is incoherent in the context of 
genealogical critique. If truth is presented as relative to epistemes, then discourse is 
historically relative. Yet Foucault's genealogies of discipline, madness and sex entail a 
critical unmasking of the purposes to which discourse has been put in practice. What 
then, Taylor quite rightly asks, is the basis for this critique? Foucault sounds like he 
thinks he is external to the truth regimes he describes220 Foucault's genealogies look at 
history with an element of critique, yet he refuses to make any valuational claims, from 
which to derive such criticism.221 How can genealogy liberate us from power if there is 
no truth independent of the regime of power? Liberation cannot be linked to a truth that 
transcends power, since truth, according to Foucault, depends on power. 
219 Alcoff, L. 1990: 3. 
220 Taylor, C. "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 98. 
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With Foucault's epistemological perspective, Taylor argues, there is no way to measure 
gains or decreases in liberation or truth. Any truth you discover is merely the product of 
an appeal to claims to knowledge from the community, which you address.222 This, I 
shall later prove, is correct. McNay takes the objection further, arguing that Foucault is 
too reductionist, and that knowledge functions in his account as little more than a 
function of domination. Foucault thus 'effaces the critical autonomy of knowledge,223, 
although this autonomy precisely underlies the standpoint from which he launches his 
political critique. Foucault's epistemological standpoint is thus incoherent. Grumley 
argues that without universal, epistemological foundations, free of historical and political 
contingency, Foucault cannot distinguish eradicable and coercive relations of power, 
which lends his work an unfortunate fatalism224. 
The common sense objection to Foucault is that if truth, cultural values and norms are 
always subordinated to relations of power, this leads to straightforward relativism, the 
enemy of sound moral sensibility. Foucault's epistemological assault seems to leave no 
room for discriminatory criteria for domination or oppression. His empirical analysis is 
interesting, scholarly and compelling, but his epistemological standpoint, which 
discredits its own authority, must be misguided. This gist of the Cartesian 
epistemological objection to Foucault is that ideological critique needs to appeal to the 
truth behind the mask of power, but this is impossible in a regime-relative context.22S 
Section Four: Immanent Critique vs. Epistemic Foundationalism 
My reply to the above objection has two parts. My first argument against Taylor'S 
objection is that it entails a juridical conception of sovereign rights, which Foucault 
criticises obscuring the relational strategies of power situated in discourse. I use 
Foucault's genealogy of sovereign rights to expose the problem of a-historicism in 
221 Wisnewski , J. 2000: 419. 
222 Taylor, C. " Foucault on Freedom and Truth" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 93. 
223 McNay, L. 1994: 64 (i.e. he discredits the authority of knowledge, from an unbiased perspective). 
224 Grumley, J. 1989: 203. 
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foundational epistemology. Disguising the political implications of knowledge claims 
makes way for a normalisation of, potentially asymmetrical, power relations (i.e. 
domination), as I will soon explain. Secondly, as an alternative to foundational 
epistemology, I examine Hegel's notion of immanent critique, which I use to defend 
Foucault's genealogical political analysis. Immanent critique does not rely on a-political 
neutrality, like epistemic foundationalism, but rather assesses the purposes served by 
discourses of legitimation from within their own theoretical presuppositions. 
Let us begin with Taylor's objection. Epistemic foundationalism allows for criteria by 
which to discern disinterested, objective knowledge claims, making it possible, in theory, 
to posit universal human rights. On this basis, Taylor's critique of Foucault assumes the 
need for a universal conception of sovereign individual rights from which to distinguish 
the coercive abuse of power226 It thus appeals to a classic juridical edifice. Each 
individual has the pre-established right not to be tortured, for example. Power is 
illegitimate when it oversteps these pre-established sovereign rights227. In turn, sovereign 
rights impose limits on the right of other individuals. Political critique then serves the 
juridical function of preventing the abuse of pre-established rights. This grants critique 
the neutral role of arbitration. The theorist's political credentials assume universal 
neutrality. 
This is precisely what Foucault's genealogy overturns. According to Foucault, the 
juridical conception of sovereign rights is invariably interpreted in tenns of disinterested 
universal law, expressing repressive power, to recall the tenn explained in the previous 
chapter. Universal law is expressed exclusively in tenns of prohibition, preventing either 
the state or the citizen from infringing on the rights of other citizens. Yet this overlooks 
the means by which productive power subjectifies individuals. Foucault argues, "Law is 
neither the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power which is at once 
complex and partial.,,228 Prohibition is not the principal fonn of investment by power. 
22S Taylor, C. "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 94. 
226 Ibid: 96. 
221 Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge. 1980: 95. 
228 Ibid: 117 . 
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Power does not only prohibit; it is not so fragile as to take only the form of repression. 
Modem technologies of power are more productive, individualized and efficient than 
forced tolerance. Taylor's juridical conception of power in terms of sovereign rights, fails 
to take account of productive mechanisms of power, which come to affect the 
constitution of the individual subject, whose freedom Taylor's conception of power 
conceives of as prior to the politics of power. Foucault's book Discipline & Punish shows 
how norms of subjectivity are often the means by which individuals intemalise the 
constraints of power and begin to watch over themselves. 
With the development of disciplinary technology and the human SCiences, power 
primarily incites us to intemalise disciplinary norms229 rather than forcing us to obey its 
commands through the more expensive mechanisms of prohibition, which generate direct 
resistance. By treating human rights as universal, sovereign, and a-historical, Taylor' s 
juridical, sovereign conception of power obscures the productive power relations, which 
constitute the ' universal ' norms we are incited towards. Thus we need a political 
philosophy that isn' t erected around the problem of sovereignty, law and prohibition23o, 
but which explicitly addresses the power relations entailed in 'sovereign rights'. History 
has neglected the mechanisms of power by focusing exclusively on those who 
repressively ' held it.,231 
Power, as I demonstrated in greater detail in my previous chapter, is not only about 
repression. One's interests are socially mediated in relations of power. Power and 
resistance give shape to each other. Foucault takes up Clausewitz's assertion that "War is 
politics by other means.,,232 Similarly, politics is war continued by other means. Politics 
ends war, and administers relations of force established by war. Peace, then, is not the 
suspension of disequilibrium. Politics 'reinscribes' these relations of force on language, 
economics and social institutions, sanctioning disequilibrium through the legitimating 
229 Ibid: 119. 
230 Ibid: 121. 
231 Ibid: 51. 
232 Ibid: 90. 
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discourse of universal la~33 Modem power is no longer centralized through the 
sovereign or exclusively through the state but is dispersed through capillary institutions 
such as schools, the clinic and prisons, as well as the norms established by the biological 
and human sciences (subconscious drives, for example). Disciplinary mechanisms have 
been super-imposed over the system of sovereign rights, concealing the actual procedures 
and domination in the techniques of power. According to Foucault, the theory of 
sovereignty and its codes are used to legitimate disciplinary constraints and thereby 
disguise the actual mechanisms of domination. 234 
Foucault's genealogy of sovereign power reveals the inadequacy of a foundational 
epistemology, such as Taylor's, which allows for universal claims about sovereign rights. 
If political relations shaping knowledge claims are obscured by the pretension of 
disinterestedness, the formulation of sovereign rights may serve as a means of 
domination. However, Foucault's point about the necessary relations of power wound up 
in knowledge claims is not entirely negative. Although knowledge is necessarily 
constituted in relations of power, knowledge does not necessarily serve as a means of 
domination. The positive point is that since discourse transmits power, discourse can also 
be used to undermine and expose power. 
This is where the role of immanent critique comes in. Discourse such as Foucault's 
reveals inconsistencies in political theory, from a position of immanent critique, to 
expose the political motives behind universal pretensions. Immanent critique agrees to 
play the devil's advocate and accept the rules of the object of critique, hypothetically 
assuming its terms of discourse - to show where it is self-refuting. A similar tactic was 
employed by Marx, whose immanent critique of capitalism involved accepting the rules 
of the game laid down by classical political economists to show that - by its own rules -
capitalism contradicts itself35. 
233 Ibid: 90-91 . 
234 Ibid: 104-106. 
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With immanent critique, one accepts the presuppositions of the political theory one 
examines, to show how they are used towards the ends of domination. This is preferable 
to foundational epistemology, since there can be no disinterested position from which to 
critique theoretical presuppositions, since all theory entails relations of power. There is 
no a-political perspective from which to justify sovereign rights, which is why Taylor's 
epistemic foundationalism is inadequate for the task of disinterestedness to which he 
wants to put it. In fact, power and discourse are irreducible. Through the selection of 
useful discourse, interest plays a fundamental role in determining what counts as 
knowledge and what does not. Thus Foucault offers us a 'cynical' discourse, which does 
not consider itself a meta-discourse, but acknowledges its own SUbjective position in 
historically contingent relations of power. 
Foucault's genealogical critique reminds us that the humanist presuppositions of 
sovereign rights such as Taylor's have played a part in the legitimation of domination 
under the illusion of pre-constituted freedom, where, in fact, power relations are ongoing. 
Free trade economic liberalism, for example, has been used to maintain asymmetrical 
power relations on a global scale, justified in terms of universal interest on an un-level 
playing field. Foucault's immanent critique of the human sciences unmasks its role in the 
development of disciplinary technologies that have served to normalise given states of 
affairs, with asymmetrical relations of power, by citing their universal applicability. Does 
he thereby discredit his own work?236 
I wish to argue that Foucault's avoidance of normative, universal commitments, such as 
Taylor's, allows him to avoid legitimating aspiring contestants in the struggle over what 
is to count as the truth. If, qua intentionality, every representation of the world is socially 
mediated and thus contingent on interpretation, then we cannot derive an account of the 
world beyond politics. Knowledge is the instrument by which we apprehend reality. But 
if it is an instrument, then we can't help reshaping the object of knowledge. Thus it is 
2JS For example, interest one: pay as little as possible for labour, to extract maximum surplus value. Interest 
two: sell surplus value to capitalist employees in the form of commodities. But, overall, capitalists' 
employees are also their market: hence the contradiction. 
236 Grumley, J. 1989: 199. 
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preferable to assess political discourse in terms of its own underlying assumptions, rather 
than from an allegedly a-political universal foundation: hence the need for immanent 
critique, as opposed to foundational epistemology. 
Avoiding universal political commitments, however, does not entail relativist 
subjectivism. As I demonstrated in chapter two, interest is constituted in relations of 
power. One's interests cannot be made self-present since dialectical intentionality 
involves a rejection of the metaphysics of presence, ruling out discrete self-present 
interest. Both Hegel's allegory of master-slave relations, and Sartre's characterisation of 
sadomasochistic flights from transcendence or facticity demonstrate the ontological 
impossibility of subjectivism. That knowledge is interested does not mean it is subjective. 
Autonomy is constituted in relations of power; it is not attainable in isolation. That 
knowledge is interested does not make it subjective, since there is no pre-discursively 
autonomous individual in the first place. Subjectivism requires one to posit discrete, 
subjective, not inter-subjective, interests, which the ontology I have argued for avoids. 
On the other hand, positing the conditions of justice by means of minimalist assumptions 
about rational agency and human choice, Taylor's discourse of human rights neglects the 
historical and political context of rights-claims. As Hegel demonstrated, liberal 
government is not the product of nature and rational reflection, but a result of historical 
processes involving struggle237. Foucault takes up this perspective to show that the 
structures of social life are not only constraints on freedom, but also a context for the 
development of powers and capacities. Autonomy is not some 'natural datum,238 that we 
all begin with, nor is rational interest-satisfaction confined to the agency of individuals. 
Rationality can also be predicated of institutions and political cultures239• Political 
community is in part constitutive of what it means to be human. The accusation of moral 
subjectivism against Foucault is predicated on the notion of autonomous, rational agency: 
an a-historical abstraction. 
237 Smith. S. 1989: ix. 
238 Ibid: 3. 
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By contrast, immanent critique is not derived from the first principles of a foundation of 
knowledge, but rather seeks "the standards of rationality within existing systems of 
thought, on their own terms,,,240 proceeding from the world of opinion and not from 
conditions specified in advance. Thus it is "an historically and hermeneutically sensitive 
form of cultural criticism.,,241 As Hegel put it, "thinking is not simply about the world - it 
is something that takes place in the world.,,242 Hegel teaches us that the interpreter is 
always situated. Locke' s 'state of nature', for example, was used to justify a particular 
liberal interpretation of universal rights. The 'natural law' of social contract theory is an 
Enlightenment attempt to make moral judgments natural, citing a pre-political state of 
nature as the origin of man's rights and 0 bligations243 thereby allowing for a single moral 
order based on facts of universal human nature, needs and interests. Immanent critique 
rejects such universal abstraction, such disinterested pretensions, and instead critiques 
political theory from within its own theoretical presuppositions. 
Experience is necessarily interpreted from an interested perspective. Foundational 
epistemology tries to judge beliefs by their mapping onto the world. But this requires a 
further yardstick, independent of politically interested interpretation, by which to 
measure, which we don't have. Absolving one's claims from interpretation, and 
pretending universality, obscures the practical function of knowledge in everyday life. 
Epistemic foundationalism facilitates dogmatism and domination. Resistance is 
suppressed by the belief that a given system is necessary and impartial. By contrast, the 
solution of immanent critique to this problem is to engage in an internal examination of 
knowledge, seeking criteria of validity from within existing forms of knowledge244. By 
acknowledging the political interestedness of knowledge it is better able to reveal the 
political purposes to which claims of impartiality are put. 
239 Ibid 
240 Ibid: 10. 
24 1 Ibid: 10 
242 Hegel, GWF, in Smith, S. 1989: 10. 
243 Smith, S. 1989: 25 . 
244 Ibid: 173 . 
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The problem with Hegel's method of immanent critique is its seductive teleology. If 
contradiction is interpreted in Hegel as overcome in synthesis, an a-political position is 
derived from which to assess historical progress. But if struggle is ongoing, as I believe 
history necessitates, then this teleological position is external to the process, and provides 
the very sort of epistemic foundation, which Hegel's historicism rejects. The same 
problem crops up with Marx. It is all very well exposing contradictions in the economic 
relations of capital from within, but the universalistic telos of communist utopia is 
illegitimate except as an ideal. Ideally, conflicts of interest should be overcome, but such 
a state of affairs is, if history is anything to go by, out of reach. Marx's useful tools of 
analysis are thereby subject to caricature and colonization245 . If communism is a-political, 
allowing for an overcoming of conflicts of interest, then the communist point of view 
claims universal legitimacy. This pretension once again obscures the power relations 
entailed in political theory, as with foundational epistemology. 
Nevertheless, the Hegelian, and Marxist, notion of immanent critique can be adapted by 
refusing the notion of synthesis as an overcoming of contradiction, and treating it instead 
as a perpetual becoming, thereby undermining the epistemic foundations of Absolute 
Spirit, or communist utopia. These may be ideals, which we might wish to work towards, 
but one must acknowledge there is no overcoming of the struggles that shape our 
existence. We kill to eat, fight viruses and struggle against each other. Foucault's 
genealogies of power take on the fundamental premise of immanent critique. They avoid 
universal foundations, instead providing instruments of analysis; "to locate lines of 
weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured and 
implanted themselves by a system of organization ... ,,246 Immanent critique refuses 
absolutes or constants because we are never finished with history. 
Philosophy has an important role to play in preventing reason from going beyond the 
limits of experience. Hence it is important for us to watch over 'the excessive powers of 
245 Foucault, M: Power/Knowledge. 1980: 81. 
246 Ibid: 62. 
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political rationality,247. It is important to keep an eye on the links between rationalisation 
and power248, between power and knowledge, to make facile gestures difficult. One 
admits interest, bias, when addressing political perspectives, to being within the discourse 
and social practices of history. But immanent critique offers no prognosis, nor 
prescription. It functions only within the terms of its object. "A society without power 
relations can only be an abstraction .. . [thus J it is not a matter of emancipating truth from 
every system of power... but of detaching the power of truth from forms of 
hegemony,,,249 to facilitate resistance. Foucault accepts the goal of emancipation in the 
political theory he critiques, to question its universal pretensions. 
A foundational humanist critique such as Taylor's, of Nazi concentration camps, for 
example, would appeal to the sovereign right of the individual not to be treated like this. 
By contrast, immanent critique would appeal not to an outside perspective, but to 
inconsistencies in Nazi ideology. This may sound ineffectively academic, but the German 
population in the 1930's was not inherently evil. Somehow Nazi ideology was 
legitimated through the appeal to something the German people believed in. Germany 
was a broadly Christian society. Something nasty worked its way between German values 
and Nazi practice. Immanent critique would involve clearing up exactly what that was, to 
show how and where good German values were corrupted by Nazi hegemony, thereby 
de-legitimating Nazism's appeal to such values. Political critique need not appeal to 
foundational human rights where there are plenty of historically generated values to go 
round. 
By contrast with Taylor's epistemic foundationalism, immanent critique is not the search 
for universal, necessary, formal structures with universal value, but an investigation into 
the discursive events that constitute us. The aim is not to identify universal structures of 
knowledge and moral action, but to treat instances of discourse that articulate what we 
say, think and do as historical eventi50 Critique is not about reflecting on what is true 
247 Foucault, M. "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfuss & Rabinow. 1982: 210. 
'48 Ibid. 
'49 Foucault, M. in Wisnewski, J. 2000: 430-431. 
'50 Foucault, M. " What is Enlightenment?" in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: 315 . 
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and what is false but rather our relationship to truth and the purposes it serves. As 
Foucault argued, "There is no sovereign philosophy but a philosophy in activity.,,251 
Some may miss a little monarchy in philosophy, but others realize "that the world is 
error, that history is filled with people of no consequence, and that it is time for others to 
keep quiet so that at last the sound of their disapproval may be heard.,,252 The power that 
is determined tbrough systems of truth can be challenged through those very systems. It 
is imperative to do so. 
In an anonymous interview in 1980, Foucault argued: 
The role of the intellectual is not to tell others what they must do. By what right would he do so? 
Remember all the prophesies, promises, injunctions and plans intellectuals have been able to 
fonnulate in the course of the last two centuries and of which we have seen the effects. The work 
of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does 
in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working 
and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions ... [toJ 
make facile gestures difficult.'" 
Critique is not about replacing one certitude with another, but rather an engagement with 
theories on their own terms, without the external, universal foundation of epistemic 
foundationalism such as Taylor's. This part of the chapter defended the claim made by 
Foucault that knowledge is generated in historically and politically contingent relations of 
power, which condition the knowing subject, demonstrating epistemological coherence of 
Foucault's political analysis in terms of immanent critique. Yet the conceptions of 
sovereign power, pre-political freedom, and universal human rights, which are 
presupposed in Taylor's objection to Foucault, fail to take this contingency into account. 
By contrast, immanent critique addresses the historicity of knowledge claims by engaging 
with the object of critique on its own terms, rather than from a supposedly universal 
standpoint. 
'" Foucault, M. "The Masked Philosopher" in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: 327. 
"'[bid. 
253 Foucault, M. Foucault Live: 462. 
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PART TWO - FOUCAULT'S POSITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Having argued that immanent critique is preferable to foundational epistemology, I will 
now show that Foucault makes constructive epistemological commitments with his 
power/knowledge thesis, which avoid the a-historicism of foundational epistemology, 
identified as a problem in the previous section. This runs contrary to Rorty's argument 
that Foucault makes no epistemological commitments. On the one hand, Taylor rejects 
Foucault's work as Philosophically incoherent because he says it fails to take a viable 
epistemological standpoint; on the other, Rorty endorses Foucault as a post-Philosophical 
theorist because he says he moves beyond epistemology. Against Rorty, I will argue that 
Foucault makes explicit epistemological commitments, and then go on to show that 
Foucault's epistemology overcomes the problems I identified with epistemic 
foundationalism in the previous section. I argue it is essential in political philosophy to 
reject Taylor's naturalistic epistemology in favour of the historicist epistemology entailed 
by Foucault's notion of powerlknowledge. 
This half of the chapter will take the following course, in four sections: First I discuss 
Rorty's treatment of the history of modem epistemology to explain his distinction 
between modern epistemological philosophy, the search for universal justifying criteria 
for knowledge, and post-epistemological philosophy. I then turn to Rorty's discussion of 
Foucault to show how he aligns Foucault with his own pragmatist, post-epistemological 
project. In the second section I demonstrate through Foucault's work the extent to which 
Rorty has got things right - pragmatic utility and Foucault's notion of power are very 
similar. However, I argue that Foucault's conception of powerlknowledge entails a 
distinct epistemology. In section three I defend Foucault's historicist epistemology 
against an objection to its reflexive incoherence: Foucault makes a-historical stipulations 
on the nature of knowledge, but his epistemology - a knowledge claim itself - says 
knowledge is necessarily historical. I will defend Foucault's historicist epistemology by 
demonstrating both its ontological grounding and the value of such an approach. Lastly, I 
argue that Foucault's powerlknowledge dyad overcomes the problems I will identify with 
an a-historicist epistemology, using Taylor's naturalist account as an example. 
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Section One: A Genealogy of Knowledge, the End of Epistemology 
This section will explain Rorty's argument that Foucault's philosophy is post-
epistemological, to show how much of what Foucault says about power and knowledge 
appears post-epistemological, contrary to the claim I wish to make that Foucault makes a 
positive contribution to epistemology that is valuable for political philosophy. First I 
explain what Rorty means by post-epistemological philosophy, and then go on to show 
why he thinks Foucault is doing this sort of work. 
In Philosophy and the Mirror o/Nature [PMN], Rorty argues that modem epistemology 
has come to an end at the end of the 20th Century254. He explains that modem 
epistemology was founded on Descartes' notion of the mind as a source of necessary 
truths, distinct from the contingent empirical domain255 The concerns of modem 
epistemology, he argues, have historically proved misguided. He claims epistemology 
involves the search for criteria by which to derive apodictic truth - which, once unveiled, 
compels the mind to believe once unveiled. Rather than aiming to end argument with 
apodictic truth, Rorty posits knowledge based on dialectically generated pragmatic utility, 
aimed towards continuing conversation. PMN gives us a 'theoretical diagnosis,256 of 
modem epistemology to make way for post-epistemological philosophy. Rorty claims 
knowledge is historically generated for its utility. Furthermore, he bases this claim about 
knowledge on historically generated evidence for its utility, rather than epistemological 
argument, or proof. Thus, he argues, he moves beyond epistemology. 
Rorty's most sustained historical demonstration of the practical futility of the modem 
notion of epistemology (a theory of knowledge) as first-philosophy occurs in chapter 
three of P MN. His historical account motivates pragmatism as a more useful successor to 
epistemology, arguing that it allows us to do more useful philosophical work, by turning 
254 Rorty, R. 1979 [hereafter PMN): 136: Rorty claims that knowledge as a problem which needs a theory is 
the product of the 17"' Century attempt to establish philosophy as an autonomous scholastic discipline 
viewing knowledge as an assemblage of representations requiring foundational criteria of justification. 
'-" Rorty's 'theoretical diagnosis' seems not dissimilar to Foucault's genealogical method ofhistoricizing 
the production of true discourses to reveal their flaws. 
'" Williams, M. "Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature" in Rorty & His Critics, 2000: 191. 
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away from the search for foundational certainty: indubitable universal principles which 
determine all accuracy of representation according to a correspondence notion of truth. 
By contrast, pragmatism treats knowledge as historically relative and hinged on socially, 
or 'conversationally' mediated interests257. Let us take an overview of Rorty's historical 
evidence to see what he means by the end of modem epistemology, so that we might 
evaluate the alignment of Foucault's powerlknowledge with Rorty's 'post-
epistemological' , pragmatist concerns. 
Descartes' 'certainty of mind' allows for the formation of modem epistemology - which 
addresses what we can know and how we might know it better by means of reflection. Its 
practitioners regard modem epistemology as a foundational science, the basis of all other 
sciences, formulated with necessary truths arrived at by means of rational reflection on 
the essence of mind, which is the source of indubitability258 Kant argued on the basis of 
Descartes' dualist metaphysics that, since we constitute ideas, we have a priori 
knowledge of them259. If beliefs are based on a) empirical intuition (a posteriori sense 
data) mixed with b) the constituting activity of the mind (a priori conceptual categories), 
and we can know how our mind functions, b) then we can unpack beliefs in their 
constituent parts and thereby determine whether they are justified and true or not. As 
Rorty argues, however, you cannot discern intuition from conceptualisation, since we 
have both at the same time. But if knowledge is historically contingent, and we can't 
discern what we make from what we find, where does this leave modem epistemology's 
universal, foundational certainties? 
Rorty argues that it is with the abandonment of the search for foundational certainty that 
pragmatism ought to replace modem epistemology26o. Nietzsche's notion of will to 
power, Bergson's ' intentionality', Heidegger's rejection of objectivity as a conflation of 
appearance with reality, and lastly Quine's argument that we can't discern language from 
257 PMN: 386. "We don ' t need a new epistemology, or ideology, but a blocking of canonical vocabularies 
with conversation." - also PMN: 33 I: "We must abandon the notion of certain values (,rationality', 
'disinterestedness') floating free of institutional and educational practices of the day." 
258 PMN: 136. 
25' Ibid: 137. 
26Q Rorty, R. Consequences of Pragmatism. 1982 [hereafter CP]: xvii: 
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experience as the cause of our responses, contribute to the pragmatist rejection of modem 
epistemology - the search for foundational criteria with which to assess accuracy of 
representation. The pragmatist, "Drops the notion of truth as correspondence with reality 
altogether, and says that modem science does not enable us to cope because it 
corresponds, it just plain enables us to cope.,,261 Knowledge, for the pragmatist, IS 
interested. 
If knowledge is interested, and interest is historically contingent and generated out of 
conflicting relations of power, there can be no universal necessities in knowledge that are 
not a priori true, i.e. by definition. By contrast with modem epistemology, pragmatism 
follows the Hegelian line that, "Philosophy is its time grasped in thought.,,262 Hence there 
can be no unified, a-historical, necessary discourse against which all other discourses can 
be compared. We don't yet have one, and nor do we know how to get one, argues 
Rortl63 . We can't step outside our skins to compare ourselves with something Absolute 
and escape contingencl64. "Regress of interpretation cannot be cut off by the sort of 
'intuition' Cartesian epistemology took for granted.,,265 The pragmatic response to such a 
problem is to move on with something more useful, to abandon the modem tradition of 
Philosophy as needing a theory of knowledge266 Rorty's genealogy of modem 
epistemology, "The history of attempts to isolate the True," shows, "there is no 
interesting work to be done in this.,,267 Since this argument is historically, and not 
formally, generated, Rorty claims it is not epistemological. 
Having outlined Rorty's pragmatist argument against modem epistemology, I will end 
this section by examining his alignment of Foucault with the post-epistemological 
261 Ibid: xvii. 
262 Ibid: 174. He curiously concludes later this "prevents man from deluding himself with the notion that he 
knows himself, or anything else, except under optional descriptions" (PMN: 379) - one comes to expect 
Rorty to be more cautious about metaphysically oriented words like 'delusion' than he is here. 
263 PMN: 348. 
264 CP: xix: Language is a tool, 'there is no way to think about our purposes or the world except by using 
language,' and thus, 'Philosophy, the attempt to say how language relates to the world ... is on this view, 
impossible. ' 
265 Ibid: xx. 
266 PMN: 348. See also CP: xiv - x. 
267 CP: xiv. A bold claim considering the scale of interests involved. 
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perspective of pragmatism. Rorty maintains that Foucault' s theory ofpowerlknowledge is 
not an epistemological thesis about the truth. 268 He argues Foucault can be aligned with 
pragmatism through Nietzsche's contribution to his work. According to Rorty, Foucault, 
like Nietzsche, is, "Content to take the halo off words like 'truth' and 'science' and 
'knowledge' and 'reality', rather than offering a view about the nature of things named 
by those words.,,269 Nietzsche's philosophy shows life without metaphysical comfort, 
post-God, post-universal foundation, so to speak, and post-epistemology, to use Rorty's 
term. Rorty argues that Foucault abandons of the hope of discovering the truth, rejecting 
the distinction between making and finding, discovery and creation. Rorty argues 
Foucault and the pragmatists are, "The true heirs of Nietzsche and James," in their 
rejection of metaphysics of presence: the rejection, "Of any privileged vocabulary 
escaping what we read into it [the object]. ,,270 Let us evaluate this assessment. 
Section Two: Foucault's Epistemology 
This section begins with a discussion of Foucault, which lends weight to Rorty's claim 
that Foucault rejects modem epistemology. I then look at Baudrillard's claim that power 
functions as an epistemological principle in Foucault's work, to suggest that, whilst 
Foucault's work is post-epistemological in Rorty's sense, it nevertheless entails an 
alternative epistemology to the modem tradition Rorty discusses in PMN. I use 
Baudrillard's claim that power functions as a final principle of explanation for Foucault 
to show that, contrary to Rorty, there is epistemological commitment entailed by his 
theory ofpowerlknowledge. 
In "Truth and Juridical Forms,,27I Foucault objects to KantianiCartesian epistemology, 
which distinguishes between experience and conceptualisation. For Foucault, there is no 
pre-defined distinction between making and finding - rational conceptualisation and 
sense perception - to be isolated. By implication, by Rorty's criteria, Foucault thereby 
'" CP: 152. 
'69 Ibid: 150. 
270 Ibid: 152 . 
271 Foucault, M. The essentia/works a/Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol. "Power" 1997-2000: 3. 
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rejects any epistemological foundation: knowledge is historically generated in relations of 
power, which rules out foundational criteria of justification. 
Foucault claims that Nietzsche's is the best model for a method to historically analyse 
knowledge. This is because, as early as 1873, Nietzsche declared knowledge an invention 
of man272 Conceptual criteria are not inscribed in human nature as an irreducible 
essence, as Kant supposed. Knowledge, Nietzsche realized, and Foucault agrees, is made, 
not found. Since representations are made, they do not correspond objectively to that 
which they represent273 . Interest rules out correspondence with 'nature'. Foucault makes 
this point, citing Nietzsche: 
Let us guard against saying there are laws in nature ... There can be no relation of natural 
continuity between knowledge and the things that knowledge must know .. . Knowledge can only 
be a violation of the things known, and not a perception, recognition, identification with those 
things. 274 
The above discussion of Foucault reveals the resemblance between his and Rorty's 
positions. Rorty rejects the Cartesian notion of our having a 'glassy essence', allowing us 
to mirror nature with our knowledge; Foucault rejects the transcendent subject, used to 
ground Cartesian epistemology, somehow essentially distinct from experience, and 
consequently the distinction "between knowledge and things [known ],,275 Thus, like 
Rorty, Foucault rejects a priori criteria of knowledge of modem epistemology. 
Consistent with Rorty's characterisation of him, Foucault argues knowledge is an 
activity, a tool; not a universal structure, but an activity, which takes place in ongoing 
' strategic, perspectival, relations' of struggle. 
Knowledge, for Foucault, is historically generated in relations of power, in relation to 
interests, as a tool (utility), which is why the CartesianlKantian approach to 
epistemology, as based on foundational, universal certainties, is flawed. It is no surprise 
272 Ibid: 7. 
273 Ibid: 9. Note the parallels with Rorty. 
274 Nietzsche, The Gay Science: 109. 
m Foucault, M. The essential works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol. "Power" 1997-2000: 9. i.e. he 
rejects the conception of knowledge as accuracy of representation 
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then that Rorty endorses Foucault276. This has been the easy part. The difficulty is to 
show that Foucault makes positive epistemological commitments, which contradicts 
Rorty's claims. I now turn to Baudrillard, who claims that power functions as a final 
principle of explanation in Foucault's work, to show how, despite these supposedly post-
epistemological claims, Foucault makes epistemological commitments with his theory of 
power/knowledge. 
Against, "The search for some final vocabulary, which can somehow be known in 
advance to be the common core, the truth of all the other vocabularies which might be 
advanced in its place,,,277 Rorty makes the argument he sees as Foucault's: "There is 
nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that 
we've not created in the course of creating a practice.,,278 By contrast, Baudrillard 
criticises Foucault, arguing that power functions as a fmal principle of explanation, an 
epistemological premise, in his work: 
Even ifit has no fmality and no last judgment, power returns to its own identity again as afinal 
principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can be told; it is what structures 
the indeterminate equation of the word ... What Foucault does not see is that 'power' [as a fmal 
principle of explanation] .. . is only a simulation of perspective - it is no more reality than 
economic accumulation - and what a tremendous trap that is ... Something at the bottom of the 
whole system resists the infinite expansion of production - otherwise, we would all be already 
buried.279 
Baudrillard's point is that power functions as the very sort of last principle Foucault had 
rejected in the humanist theory of the subject. What shows us that knowledge is 
interested? Power. The interestedness of knowledge proves that knowledge is interested. 
The circular logic reveals Foucault's epistemological base camp. The point at which a 
theorist ceases to provide the skeptic with further justification reveals her epistemological 
foundation. 
276 Interestingly, RoTty shows that Nietzsche's work mirrored that of James, and Husserl mirrored Russell, 
historically. In the late 70 's Analytic and Continental philosophy once again match up two philosophers, 
RoTty and Foucault, working independently, in distinct philosophical traditions, in parallel. In fact, RoTty's 
dismissal of commensurability between 'vocabularies' (e.g. epistemology/pragmatism) appears unwound 
by his own brilliant performance as he threads together the vocabularies of analytic, continental, Ancient 
and Modem Philosophy in his easy-going, down-to-earth narrative style. 
271 CP: 152 
278 ibid 
279 Baudrillard, J. 1987: 40-41. 
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Baudrillard argues that power is a final principle, a base epistemological premise in 
Foucault's work, while Rorty argues Foucault rejects final principles, making him post-
Philosophical. What if Rorty is right and Foucault knows powerlknowledge is just 
another vocabulary, as historical as any other, made not found, yet Baudrillard is right 
that he uses this as his final vocabulary? Foucault uses power as a basic epistemic 
principle yet acknowledges its historicity. In the section following, I will argue for the 
philosophical coherence of this epistemological position, by grounding it in terms of the 
ontology I set up in the first two chapters. 
The truth about knowledge, Foucault, at the end of skeptical interrogation, would be 
forced to admit, is that it is interested. But Foucault claims there is no absolute value to 
rationality in the very same space where he claims rationality is instrumentality280 This is 
not a flat -out contradiction: instrumentality dislocates any absolute value attached to 
rationality; but rationality remains tied to something absolute: instrumentality. 
Instrumentality does not dictate purpose, but it nevertheless partly dictates what 
knowledge entails. We should not be surprised by Foucault's admission in the late 
1970' s: 
The problem of the truth of what I say is a difficult one for me; in fact it's the central problem. 
That' s the question I still haven't answered.281 
Though Rorty makes a convincing case that Foucault rejects epistemology, we find 
Foucault uncertain as to what he's done in this regard, and Baudrillard convinced that, in 
his rejection of humanism, Foucault simply replaces man with power282 as a source of a-
historical epistemological foundation, making a universal epistemological claim with his 
theory of powerlknowledge. His fundamental premise that 'knowledge is interested' (i.e. 
generated out of historical relations of power) - his final word on the matter - with no 
further justification than a circular argument, arrives at an epistemological base camp. 
280 Foucault, M. The essential works oj Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol. "Power" 1997-2000: 229. 
281 Ibid: 241. 
282 a similar move to the one I showed earlier in this thesis with Foucault' s post-Archaeological admission 
about the trap of treating structuralist discourse as a theoretical a priori 
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The previous half of this chapter restricted its analysis to Foucault's 'immanent' critique. 
Yet it appears there may be a positive epistemological standpoint in his method after all. 
Against modem epistemology, which claims knowledge is distinct from the contingent 
empirical domain, Foucault posits an historicist epistemology. This historicism need not 
undermine the epistemological status of Foucault's powerlknowledge dyad. In the 
following section I will defend this historicist epistemology ontologically. 
Section Three: Historicist Epistemology 
This section makes use of the ontological work done in chapters one and two to 
demonstrate the necessity of choice in belief, as well as the value of recognising this . 
Foucault's epistemology casts suspicion on the 'disinterested' claims he debunks through 
his genealogical analysis. However, his historicism about knowledge may be thrown 
reflexively back as a criticism of his own knowledge claims283 : The a priori stipulation of 
his 'powerlknowledge' thesis arises from a historically contingent context, so how can it 
put forward a necessary stipulation on the nature of knowledge? I argue that the ongoing 
power relations I demonstrated in the previous two chapters show that knowledge is 
necessarily interested, and that it is bad faith to think otherwise. In fact, as the final 
section of this chapter will show, in view of Foucault's historicist epistemology, a-
historicist epistemology proves untenable. Foucault's historicism overcomes the flaws 
with foundational, naturalistic284 epistemology such as Taylor' s, for political theory. 
I first draw out the epistemological premises entailed by Foucault's discussion of 
knowledge in "Questions of Method." Secondly, I explain the reflexive objection against 
historicist epistemology. I then defend both the necessity and value of Foucault's 
historicist epistemology by demonstrating its ontological grounding in terms of 
existential phenomenology, with which Foucault's historicism is consistent. Let us begin 
with Foucault's epistemology, which I will thereafter summarise in a list. 
283 RoTty, as we saw in section one, claims that pragmatism is post-epistemological. For him, historicism 
and epistemology are inconsistent. 
284 By naturalistic, I mean an epistemology, which allows us to make claims about natural facts, as if claims 
can be made, unmediated by political relations. 
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Foucault claims rationality is an instrument [I). Since what is rational to believe is 
historically contingent,285 knowledge is historically relative to human purposes [2). 
Hence there is no a-historical absolute against which knowledge may be assessed286[3). 
With the epistemological premises above, Foucault does not believe he has grasped any 
final truths about knowledge and power. Nevertheless, he argues, his books have had real 
consequences when people related them to their experiences. This effect, he argues, is not 
a matter of truth or falsity, but is nevertheless a real effect of his readers' relation to 
historical facts. Discourse involves an interaction between the knower and what she 
knowS287. By knowing it, the knower changes that which she knows about, and is at the 
same time changed by that which she comes to know288 "The subject, in inquiry, is 
modified by that inquiry.,,289 [4). As far as the truth of Foucault's own discourse is 
concerned, "1 say these things only insofar as 1 believe it enables us to transform them. 
Everything 1 do is with the conviction that it may be of use.,,290 Foucault uses 
powerlknowledge as a stipulation in his discourse, in order to facilitate political change 
[5). 
From the above discussion we derive the following epistemic principles from Foucault: 
I) Knowledge is interested. 
2) Since purposes change, knowledge is historically contingent. 
3) Since knowledge is interested and historically contingent, there is no a-historical 
absolute against which knowledge may be assessed. 
4) Knowledge involves an ongoing interaction between the knower and what she 
knows. 
5) Knowledge, including epistemology, is developed for its usefulness, not its final 
truth-value. 
28S Ibid These statements are drawn for the most part from an interview entitled "Questions of Method". 
286 Ibid: 229. 
287 Ibid: 253. 
288 Ibid _ knowing is an act, knowledge a tool. Thus: 'discourse/practice' 
289 Ibid: 254. as is the object of inquily, modified by inquiry 
29<) Ibid: 294. 
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I will now consider the historicism in the above epistemology to explain a potential 
objection to Foucault's approach. Epistemology itself entails knowledge claims about 
knowledge, revealing a sceptical dilemma. Modern epistemology, in Rorty's terms, 
attempts to solve this problem by finding a set of universal, a priori criteria, against 
which knowledge claims may be assessed for their justification. Foucault's epistemology 
on the other hand makes explicit its own historical contingency. By what rights, then, 
might it claim to be the last word on a necessary condition of knowledge? In point (3) we 
see, "there is no a-historical absolute against which knowledge may be assessed." Is 
'interest' not such an absolute in 'powerlknowledge'? 
To assume that knowledge is interested entails an awareness of the existential insight into 
belief - our beliefs attain significance in light of our chosen proj ects, as I will now show 
with a recapitulation of the ontology developed in chapters one and two. Foucault 
emphasises that knowledge and beliefs are partly conditioned in a social context of 
relations of power. This historicism is consistent with Sartre 's existentialist rejection of 
the distinction between facts and values. To defend Foucault's epistemology against the 
reflexive objection I have just discussed, I now return to the groundwork done in chapters 
one and two. 
The ontology I excavated from the battleground between Foucault and Sartre in the fust 
two chapters of this thesis necessarily implicates interest - through dialectical 
intentionality - in the subject's relations with the world and others. Social relations were 
shown to involve conflict of interests in both Foucault and Sartre's understandings of 
power and freedom respectively. Sartre's notion that we are a lack projecting possibilities 
into the world through our future-directed orientation entails that all so-called 'facts' 
(objective truth) about the world are affected by our desires. The existential 
phenomenological insight that our human essence is to have no essence goes all the way 
down: if we have no essence, there is no essence to anything in our world291 (our world 
passes through us as our knowledge of it entails). Our desires and projects entwine values 
291 PMN: 361. 
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with facts. As a consequence of intentionality, Sartre rejects the distinction between facts 
and values. 
Rorty interprets Sartre as dismissing the search for 'objective truth, 292 as tantamount to 
bad faith: avoiding the responsibility for choosing one's own project293 . Take Foucault's 
attitude to homosexuality as an example of what it would be not to act in bad faith 
regarding one's sexuality. Foucault insisted he had chosen to engage in homosexual 
activitl94 . Many gay rights activists insist that society accepts homosexuals since they 
are born gay. It would be as unfair, then, to discriminate against homosexuality as it is to 
discriminate against blacks. This, in Sartrean terms, is bad faith. Blaming a gay gene 
avoids the responsibility of affirming one's chosen lifestyle; looking for a gay gene as a 
natural fact, to justifY sexuality you would otherwise find problematic is a flight from 
transcendence. Belief is something we must take part in making, thus it is bad faith to 
look for apodictic truth, which speaks for itself. In Sartre' s Philosophy, the search for 
objectivity as one right way is the search for yet another thing to push us about like 
matter so we can evade the responsibility of choice. 
From existential ontology, we derive the insight that there are no value-free facts. The 
search for apodictic truth, objective foundations in epistemology, is thus in bad faith. It 
involves hiding from the responsibility to evaluate, to take a stance with belief. Thus, if 
knowledge entails belief, existential phenomenological ontology reveals that knowledge 
entails evaluation295. To hide from this is bad faith. Splitting ourselves into a) knowers of 
truths, and b) ethicaVaesthetic creatures, is a disaster296. 
That knowledge stands relative to interests has been emphasised since Hegel, who 
historicized ontology. Historical conditions, of conflicting social relations, do not rule out 
knowledge. Rather, they help define it, undoing the neat distinction between facts and 
292 in this context: accurate representations undisturbed by the bias of interestedness 
293 PMN: 361. 
294 Duncker, P. 1996: 38. 
m It is the same with Kierkegaard: the necessary responsibility of choice in belief is illustrated by the 
anguish of Abraham, who was faced with the burden of God's command: "Kill your son." Was it God? 
Had Abraham interpreted His message correctly? Would he obey? Choice is endemic. 
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values. I have used phenomenological ontology to defend Foucault's presupposition that 
knowledge is interested, yet this is still not a last word to the skeptic. What justifies the 
presupposition of ontological intentionality, one might ask? Ultimately, 
phenomenological ontology can do no more than appeal to experience. On the basis of 
this, if we are necessarily free, which it appears we are, knowledge is necessarily 
interested. 
Having argued for the value and necessity of treating knowledge as conditioned by the 
historical and political contingency of socially mediated interests, I will end this chapter 
by demonstrating how such an approach overcomes the deficiencies of an a-historicist 
account of knowledge, using Taylor's as an example ofthe latter. 
Section Four: The 'End' of Knowledge 
A phrase by Marx is pertinent here: man produces man. How should it be understood? In my 
judgment what ought to be produced is not man as nature supposedly intended him, or as his 
essence is ordained to be. We need to produce something that doesn't yet exist, without being able 
to know what it will be.297 
Taylor' s biological foundational ism serves as a good example of foundational 
epistemology at work, making clear the reasons why one might wish to refute Foucault's 
account of powerlknowledge. I have demonstrated, however, that such an approach is 
ontologically untenable, which I shall make clear in this final section. If one necessarily 
defines one's subjectivity in one 's interested relations with the world and others, and all 
knowledge is mediated through human subjects, then all that is known is conditioned by 
intentions. Having argued for the necessary choice entailed by knowledge, in this final 
section I will show how Foucault's account of powerlknowledge overcomes the problem 
of a-historicism in political philosophy, using Taylor's naturalist account as an example. 
In the previous part of this chapter, concerning immanent political critique, my discussion 
of Taylor's objection referred to his sovereign conception of human rights. Against the 
296 PMN: 364. 
297 Ibid: 275. 
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historical relativism of truth regimes, Taylor argued that torture is always wrong because 
of its effect on the natural human body. Thus, for Taylor, natural facts about the human 
body serve an a-historical, a-political basis for the critique of domination298 Natural facts 
about the body are apodictic. Regardless of one's social or historical context, we all feed 
and we all bleed, for example. Anyone can see this. The body speaks clearly through the 
political dissonance of discursive interpretation. This is biological truth: there are 
fundamental human interests, shared by all. Thus universal human rights can be 
predicated for all individuals. According to Taylor, relations of power do not always 
dominate knowledge. Natural facts about the body are an example of knowledge 
untainted by political bias, and it is through such natural facts that universal human rights 
can serve a basis for political critique from a guaranteed position of neutrality. 
Against Foucault's anti-foundationalism, Taylor argues that there is an external, overall 
picture of reality we can discern, dictated to us by biological realities. That rights are 
subject to constant revisionary strife does not mean we should take a skeptical position 
and simply repudiate these concerns. Torture, though it was accepted in medieval times, 
was practiced on basically the same type of body we have today and we can thus discern 
the reality of its harmfulness. This is a basic humanist premise. We are all humans, so we 
share basic interests from which universal principles of equality may be derived. That we 
reject torture today is an advance in human culture, argues Taylor, since it has always 
been wrong to treat the human body in such a way. By means of natural facts about the 
body, different cultures are not incommensurable. By contrast, Taylor argues, Foucault 
ties up monolithic, hermetically sealed truth-regimes as incommensurable and thus, his 
critique does not make sense.299 In effect, Taylor demands a foundational epistemology 
from Foucault. 
A foundational epistemology like Taylor'S assumes natural facts can give us a foundation 
from which to discern truth from bias. However, to use the terms discussed in the 
previous section, this is to hide the choices entailed by beliefs in self-deceptive bad faith. 
298 Taylor, C. "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" in ed. Couzens-Hoy, D The Foucault Reader: 97. 
299 Ibid. 
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To take recourse to a foundational epistemology that justifies truth claims according to 
natural facts is to tum from the necessary responsibility we have to bring beliefs into 
being through our evaluation, by tying them into the projects we value. To cite natural 
facts, as the sole justification for our beliefs, is to hide what we do from ourselves. Nazis 
deferred responsibility for their behaviour by citing natural facts about Jews, under the 
pretence of scientific disinterestedness, to justify their actions. Race was long considered 
a natural fact, but there is no significance to skin colour or facial characteristics that is not 
chosen, a product of evaluation. 
Discipline & Punish shows that even the significance of torture and execution IS 
historically and politically contingent, despite "natural facts" about the human body, 
commensurable across historical epochs. If there is a way of preventing the death of 
thousands of innocent people by torturing one brutal, vindictive criminal, then "natural 
facts about the human body come to take on a very different significance. Natural facts 
serve no purpose without evaluation. Even the meaning of death is up for grabs, as 
relatives of a coma patient might testify. Against foundational epistemology, Foucault 
denies natural facts, used to justify universal principles, thereby deferring the ongoing 
responsibility of evaluating knowledge claims, which are mediated by historically and 
politically mediated interests. 
Let us consider Foucault's treatment of sex, to draw out his theoretical position on natural 
facts, as a counter-example to Taylor. Foucault's History of Sexuality does not deny the 
materiality of the body, but is radically anti-essentialist. As Alan Megill puts it, in The 
Will to Knowledge, Foucault's history of sexual liberation and repression, for example, 
"Foucault is articulating an anti-naturalism." For all his references to the body, he is 
trying to "demolish any connection between sex (or sexuality) and a presumed natural 
substratum. He is trying to rid us of the idea of nature as norrns.,,300 We ought not to 
conceive of sexuality "as a kind of natural given that power tries to hold in check, or as 
an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover.,,301 As far as natural 
300 Megill, A: Prophets of Ambiguity. 1985 : 253. 
301 Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality Vo/.J. 1978: 139-140. 
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facts are concerned, Foucault sees nature as a human invention, used to impose political 
constraint. Foucault "finds no bench underneath the paving stones, no 'natural' order at 
all. There is only the certainty of successive regimes ofpower.,,302 
Sex, Foucault demonstrates, is constructed, not entirely natural. It is not the natural origin 
of desires but rather mediated as a cultural construct with the aim of social regulation303. 
Power does not try to dominate sexuality but rather employs it as a biological means of 
legitimation. For example it is not a natural fact that men are cheaters because they need 
to spread their seed, nor that women are natural cheaters because they seek the strongest 
genes for their children. To cite a natural fact as justification for one's behaviour involves 
a deferral of responsibility for evaluating the significance of natural facts. At what point, 
we must ask, does interpretation not step into the biological picture? In fact gender is an 
apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established, the means by 
which 'natural' sex is produced and established as pre-discursive, i.e. prior to the 
historically and politically contingent interpretation. 
The biological and historical are not consecutive to one another but are bound together in an 
increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of modem technologies of 
power that take life as their objective.304 
A foundational epistemology such as Taylor'S involves the idea that certain ways of 
treating people are absolutely and naturally wrong, regardless of political context, or 
historical precedent because of universal, natural facts about the human body. By 
contrast, historicist epistemology rejects such a-historical claims on the basis of the fact 
that historically and politically mediated inter-subjective interests affect the way we 
interpret "natural facts", as I have demonstrated in this thesis. 
The wider point Foucault makes with his genealogy of sexuality is that it is impossible to 
know the materiality of the body outside of its cultural significations305 Since all our 
experience of the world is interpreted according to particular interests in particular 
historical situations, we can derive no a-historical, a-political account of universal human 
302 Megill, A. 1985: 254. 
30J McNay, L. 1994: 30. 
304 Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality Vol. 1. 1978: 153. 
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interests, or disinterested knowledge. We can make no disinterested claims about human 
rights or natural facts about the body. Objects don't just give us knowledge, argues 
Foucault. Knowledge grows out of our interests. Powerlknowledge is what knowledge is. 
Knowledge is thus historically and politically contingent. Yet the very claim, 'knowledge 
is interested,' entails an a-historical stipulation on knowledge. If knowledge is biased, 
does this undermine Foucault's claims about what knowledge is? 
Historicist epistemology, which posits knowledge as conditioned by social and political 
interests, is justified on historical lines by the observation that knowledge claims have 
historically been conditioned by human purposes. The ontology developed in this thesis 
has been consistently justified with recourse to phenomenological observation. 
Phenomenology involves justifying premises according to experience, which is 
historically generated, rather than from preconceived notions about what experience 
entails. 
Power is a metaphysical signifier in Foucault's later work, his most basic epistemological 
criterion. Foucault's historicist epistemology, as opposed to foundational epistemology, 
such as Taylor's, is explicit about its purpose to question universal discourses. It is both 
ontologically grounded in observation and explicit about the interests it is intended to 
serve. By contrast, foundational epistemology posits a-historical claims outside of 
interpretation, 'inferring' them from 'natural facts' about the body, for example. This is 
bad faith, since knowledge is not determined by natural facts but evaluative. Beliefs are 
chosen in relation to interests. By contrast with foundational epistemology, historicist 
epistemology calls for ongoing evaluation, claiming knowledge is directed towards ends, 
as an activity, a means. In contrast to Rorty's claims about the end of epistemology, 
Foucault's epistemology overcomes a-historicism, making explicit epistemological 
commitments, which nonetheless take into account political and historical contingency, 
which I have argued is essential for political philosophy. In answer to Taylor's objection, 
knowledge is never final. Nature tells us nothing we do not interpret. It is bad faith to 
hide from the responsibility of ongoing evaluation this entails. 
305 McNay, L. 1994: 30. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have argued that political philosophy needs to take into account the 
historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. Against the 
universalistic foundations of liberal political philosophy, which rely on a model of the 
self-interested rational individual and her sovereign rights, I maintain, along with 
Foucault, that such a model abstracts from the political constitution of identity. Focusing 
on the disagreement between Foucault and Sartre, I established an ontological basis for 
the refutation of epistemic foundationalism, arguing that the subject cannot be abstracted 
from her social, historical and political context, and that knowledge is necessarily 
constituted in relation to power, in light of chosen interests, and therefore evaluative. 
Using Foucault's conceptions of power and knowledge, and Sartre's ontology, I showed 
how our interests change our experience of the world around us and ourselves, from the 
basic level of perception in intentionality through to complex social interactions in which 
our interests are mediated. In the first chapter I explained Foucault's conception of 
subjectivity by contrasting it against Sartre' s understanding of transcendent freedom to 
show how, Foucault came to theorise inter-subjective power relations. In the second 
chapter I explained relations of power in terms of dialectical negation, arguing that 
relations with others involve conflicts of interest, which are constitutive of one' s identity, 
yet this need not rule out freedom. The ontology I developed showed that freedom is both 
the product of, and impetus for, relations of power. Since our responses to our 
environment are not detennined, subjectivity is both historically and politically 
contingent. In the final chapter I drew on the methodology and ontology developed in the 
first two chapters to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account historical 
contingency, both in critique, and in the development of political theory, such as social 
contract theory. Using Foucault' s conception of powerlknowledge, I showed that 
historicist epistemology is better suited to this task than foundational epistemology. 
Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political 
philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. 
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This thesis then, aims to dialectically mediate the apparently antithetical views on the 
subject and its formation in society in the writings of Foucault and Sartre. By reading 
Foucault and Sartre dialectically, I have hoped to revealed the extent to which their 
individual formulations on the subject are inextricably linked, thereby re-evaluating the 
distinction many have made between the apparently humanist philosophy of Sartre and 
the anti-humanist philosophy of Foucault. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the 
mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and 
foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their apparent misgivings 
are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. This is not to say that the 
humanist project is not worthwhile, but that one should take into account the extent to 
which the subject and history are in constant flux and change within which an end to 
historical and political contingency is impossible. Against Rorty's claim that this means 
the end of epistemology, I have shown that epistemology such as Foucault's is able to 
address such contingency, positing knowledge as end-directed. 
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